MMU: Behind the Cover Story: Luke Mogelson on the U.S. Endgame in Afghanistan, 07 February 2012

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07 February 2012

FEATURE STORY

Behind the Cover Story: Luke Mogelson on the U.S. Endgame in Afghanistan

BUSINESS

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NATION

Taliban Considers Victory Inevitable Once Isaf Leaves: Leaked Report
Afghanistan's constitutional albatross
I'll get 'nuked' for revealing Afghan failures, admits US army colonel
Reports on Afghanistan war too rosy? Army officer, others say yes.
Afghans the losers in US election
Afghan security guard kills colleagues, police
Hezb-e-Islami Delegation Pessimistic of Qatar Talks
Afghan utopia becomes a much grimmer reality
Isaf Welcomes US -Taliban Talks
NATO: From military alliance to talk shop?
Afghan interpreters to get second chance to come to Canada
Pakistan much more important than Afghanistan: US expert
Taliban Leader Captured in Helmand, Isaf Says
Sorry, Mitt: It Won't Be an American Century
Pakistani Minister Urges Reopening Border to NATO
Nato Helicopter Crashes in Eastern Afghanistan
US colonel: Don't believe US statements on progress in Afghanistan
Paratrooper faces charges for punching Taliban insurgent

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FEATURE STORY

Behind the Cover Story: Luke Mogelson on the U.S. Endgame in Afghanistan

New York Times
By RACHEL NOLAN
February 6, 2012

Luke Mogelson is a contributing writer for the magazine based in Kabul. He wrote this week’s cover story on the endgame for the U.S. in Afghanistan. Previously for the magazine he has written about Afghan civilians killed by U.S. soldiers and the Afghan National Police.

How did you first get in touch with Echo Company?

I originally went down to Helmand to check out Marja, which was said to have become very quiet and stable since the big operation there in early 2010. Marja is indeed very quiet and stable. While there, though, I heard that a lot of fighting was still happening in the province’s northern districts — Musa Qala, Kajaki and Sangin. So I went there.

Can you tell me a little more about the relationship between the Afghan National Security Forces and U.S. Marines? You say that in one particular unit, relations were unusually close and the two groups even ate together, and maybe naïvely it surprised me that this was so unusual. In general you say the Americans regard Afghans as lazy or prone to complaining. Did you get a sense of how Afghan soldiers viewed U.S. Marines?

It really varies dramatically from unit to unit. On one end of the spectrum, you have marines and Afghans who genuinely respect and like one another. They make an effort to learn a few words from their respective languages, invite each other to share M.R.E.’s or kabuli palau, trade pinches of Copenhagen for pinches of naswa, and just generally embrace the unique camaraderie that naturally arises among fighting men confronting a common enemy. On the other end, the marines feel mainly contempt for the Afghans, who respond, predictably, by living up to the worst expectations of them: refusing to carry their own radios, blatantly smoking hash, abandoning any semblance of discipline, taking naps while on patrol. Mostly, you get something in between these two extremes.

You write that the only way to keep the Taliban from retaking control after we leave is 1) to leave behind a proficient national security force and 2) to “win them breathing room.” The extent of the second is a matter of how many operations can be accomplished in how much time. How close are we to the first?

It’s very relative. You can’t judge the Afghan National Security Forces by the same standard that you would an American military unit. You can’t expect them to fight like Americans. To me, the interesting question isn’t whether the individual soldiering skills of the men in the field will be up to the task — some will, others won’t — but whether the National Army and Police, as institutions in an incredibly corrupt government, will be capable of adequately supporting them. In Musa Qala, Lieut. Vincent Young, the leader of Echo Company’s embedded training team, which mentors the Afghan soldiers there, told me he had been trying very hard to reduce the Afghans’ reliance on the Marines. But when the Marines stopped giving them fuel, food and ammunition, Young said: “It got to the point where it was affecting operations. They couldn’t go on patrol, they couldn’t go on convoys, they couldn’t get food. So we’d refuel their vehicles and give them a barrel for the generators.” He added: “In Delaram, where their logistics hub is, the motor pool is stocked with vehicles, Rangers, Humvees. And they just sit there. They hoard all this stuff, and yet here we have to push our trucks to start them. The commander will come down, these guys will ask for parts and he’ll say, ‘Not my problem,’ then leave. No vehicle that’s been sent up to be repaired has made its way back.”

I also asked Young whether he thought the Afghans would be able to continue patrolling remoter areas, like Juz Ghoray, beyond district centers — places the Marines are going into now. He said: “They may try to patrol a little outside the security bubble. They feel comfortable now going out on their own. But I think it’s partly because they know we have tanks, trucks, a quick-reaction force. We have the ability to find them and help them, even push air support if they need it. And once we leave, that’s all gone. They’re on their own.”

An Afghan flag raised in Taliban territory where maybe none of the villagers have ever seen it before is one kind of victory, one kind of symbol. Hoisting an American flag over an American outpost is another type of symbol. Did anyone try to dissuade Sergeant Granados from doing it since it would so obviously put them in danger?

Actually, since I was in Kajaki, the marines there have stopped raising Granados’ flag at the outpost. It’s been replaced by an Afghan flag. My understanding is that the Afghan flag elicits the same reaction as the American one did — it gets shot at.

You’ve written other articles for the magazine from Afghanistan, on Afghan civilians killed by U.S. soldiers and on the Afghan National Police, but these assignments did not include embedding with marines. Was live combat as you expected it to be after talking to many soldiers, or did it surprise you?

It surprised me. What probably surprised me most was how calm and professional the marines were, even those who’d never been in combat before. This isn’t to say I’d expected them to behave differently — but still, it’s an impressive thing to behold.

In your first article for the magazine, you quoted novelist and Vietnam veteran Tim O’Brien, who wrote “in war you lose your sense of the definite, hence your sense of truth itself, and therefore it’s safe to say that in a war story nothing is ever absolutely true.” Did being shot at as part of the group ever make you doubt your sense of definite reality, which you are obviously trying to keep a handle on as a reporter?

If I had written the scene about the ambush on Devon Hill relying solely on my powers of observation and ability to absorb impressions under fire, it would have been a long, detailed description of the dirt I was staring at while lying on my face, quietly cursing. No, immediately after the ambush, I reviewed at length everything that happened with each of the Marines involved.

You write about the memorial service given to marines who die in Afghanistan. When Staff Sgt. Vincent Bell was killed, what was the reaction of the rest of the marines? Was there time or space to grieve there, or did they just have to carry on with their mission until it was possible to do the memorial service?

Staff Sgt. Vincent Bell was killed shortly after I left Kajaki for Sangin. The memorial I attended in Sangin was for two marines from Weapons Company, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, who’d been killed by an I.E.D. — Cpl. Zachary C. Reiff (June 24, 1989 – Nov. 21, 2011) and Lance Cpl. Joshua D. Corral (Dec. 30 1991 – Nov. 18, 2011). The memorial was held at a patrol base the day after Thanksgiving. Neither the holiday nor the deaths of Reiff and Corral stopped or slowed the work that Weapons Company was doing. My impression was that the space for grief is one largely carved out by each marine inside himself, insulated from strangers such as myself. I think the selection of Scripture by the chaplain who spoke at the memorial (Ecclesiastes 3:1-11) was very telling. It begins, “There is a time for everything/and a season for every activity under the heavens:/A time to kill and a time to heal.” For most marines, I imagine the time to heal — and to truly grieve — does not begin until they return home; and does not end, ever.

I know that you don’t have a crystal ball, and in your article you decline to prognosticate about Afghanistan as a whole. But after seven weeks in Helmand, what do you think is likeliest to happen there after the U.S. pulls out? A full-on Taliban revival? A mixed map? Afghans holding the line alone seems like wishful thinking given some of the scenes you describe.

Well, there are a lot of factors beyond the military one — chief among them, obviously, the success or failure of peace talks. But if, for whatever reasons, the Taliban persist in their armed resistance, then yes, I think a lot of Afghan National Security Forces will be killed in Helmand, and insurgents will backfill at least some of the areas we vacate. Many civilians might also die; 3,021 civilians were killed in Afghanistan this year — a record for the war. Most of these deaths resulted from undiscriminating tactics employed by the Taliban (suicide attacks, I.E.D.’s), which could intensify when the Americans remove from Afghanistan the abundance of sophisticated technology and equipment currently used to minimize or forestall such attacks. At the same time, it’s important to remember that the Afghan National Security Forces do not subscribe to the same rules of engagement that American soldiers and marines do. After the withdrawal, civilians will no longer enjoy that protection.

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NATION

Taliban Considers Victory Inevitable Once Isaf Leaves: Leaked Report

TOLOnews.com
Monday, 06 February 2012

TOLOnews has seen full version of a secret Nato report showing that Taliban are trying to regroup and are preparing to take over Afghanistan after complete withdrawal of foreign troops.

Parts of the report were recently published by British media.

The 27-page report has been done after interrogating 4,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda inmates.

The report shows that even though Taliban have suffered severely in 2011, their strength, motivation, funding and tactical proficiency remains intact.

More people, even members of the Afghan government, were interested to join Taliban, the report added.

Taliban have limited acts of brutality while their commanders coordinate with the village elders to determine the correct placements of mines and IEDs.

The report also indicates that Taliban militants are spread across the country while al-Qaeda and Haqqani Networks are present in eastern and central provinces of the country.

About the Afghan constitution, Taliban believe that it's a "perplexing and contradicting" document designed to centralise the government in Kabul rather than promoting Islamic values.

The report expresses that Pakistan has a vital role in the conflicts in Afghanistan while it strongly opposes President Karzai's government because its mostly influenced by India and the West.

Senior Taliban members regularly meet with ISI officials, according to the revealed report.

As far as the Haqqani Network is concerned, its based in Miran Shah area of Pakistan and gets directions from Quetta Shura .

Jalaludin Haqqani is still alive and living in the border region, while Sarajuddin Haqqani remains the top leader of Network despite living in hidings.

According to reports, Taliban commanders receive $50,000 to 200,000 a year depending on their level of operation.

The report shows that the Taliban need between $100m to $150m a year to operate.

Regarding relations of Taliban, the report reveals that Taliban are still in contact with al-Qaeda and Farsi speaking fighters of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Iran is also directly supporting the Taliban elements in Afghanistan, the report added.

Taliban realise that they cannot compete with Isaf troops in the country as they lose more and more fighters in the battlefield.

The report also says that there are possibilities of escalation of fighting after foreign combat troop pull out of the country.

In conclusion, the report reveals that ISI has full control over Taliban's activities and whereabouts of their senior leaders.

The detainees have revealed that support, recruitment and donations within Taliban have increased and the leaders control of activities have remained high.

Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan has been declared a free zone as any Taliban commander can conduct operations without prior coordination and permission from their leaders.

Narcotics is considered to be another donation for Taliban's activities in the country as they are more involved in trade of hashish and opium other than farming.

Once Isaf is no longer a factor the Taliban consider victory inevitable, the report says.

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Afghanistan's constitutional albatross

Karzai's fury at the suggestion of democracy does not bode well for either Afghanistan or the wider region.

Aljazeera
By Robert Grenier Former CIA station chief Robert Grenier heads ERG partners, a financial consultancy firm.
06 Feb 2012
Washington, DC

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, we are told, was "incredibly angry". And so, rather than being able to focus his late January discussions with Afghan officials in the way he had intended, US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman was forced to engage instead in damage control. At a January 21 press conference in Kabul, Ambassador Grossman attempted to mollify the Afghan head of state by reiterating that a peace deal could only be negotiated by Afghans, and would not be hijacked by US officials, despite current appearances to the contrary.

Apparently the US envoy's ministrations were only sufficient to bank the fires of Mr Karzai's anger, which must have burst again into flames after his departure, judging from the theatricality of a subsequent statement by US Ambassador to Kabul Ryan Crocker. Crocker attacked head-on the rumours of US support for a partition of Afghanistan - which had so unhinged Afghanistan's volatile president - characterising such stories as "lies that dishonour the sacrifice of more than 1,800 US service members who have died in the cause of a unified Afghanistan". A unified Afghanistan? The families of those fallen service members might be understandably concerned if they actually believed their loved ones to have died in service to an oxymoron.

The cause of these histrionics was a joint statement issued some days before in Berlin, following a meeting of a four-person US congressional delegation led by Congressman Dana Rohrbacher with the multi-ethnic leaders of the opposition National Front for Afghanistan. Together, they had signed a document advocating major changes in the Afghan constitution, designed to create a federal system which would devolve power from the centre to the provinces. Of the existing governmental arrangements in Afghanstan they had the following to say:

"The current system has fatally concentrated decision-making to whoever is president of the country. The Afghan president appoints the governors of each province and district, the mayor of every town, every provincial chief of police, one third of the entire Senate, and even every judge in Afghanistan.

"This centralised power has led to massive corruption, disenfranchisement of a large segment of the Afghan people, obstacles to economic development, massive abuses of power, increasing political instability, poor governance, and a vast undermining of law and order."

This is, if anything, an understatement. In place of the travesty which is the current Afghan constitution, the signers mildly suggested "decentralising the political system, making it more compatible with the diverse political, social and cultural nature of Afghanistan". And in addition to some perfectly reasonable and consistent suggestions regarding substitution of the current presidential/monarchical system with a parliamentary one built on proportional representation, the authors end with the following radical ideas:

"We also support the election of governors and empowerment of provincial councils. Such elected governors and provincial councils should also have authority for such things as creating budgets and generating revenue, overseeing police and healthcare, as well as establishing educational authority, if they so desire."

These arguments in favour of genuine democracy in Afghanistan were enough to set the diminutive Karzai, himself the chief beneficiary of foreign interference in Afghanistan, caterwauling about US-backed plots to partition the country, and complaining to the national parliament about foreigners who use the country "to do their political experiments".

The current political experiment in Afghanistan, embodied in a constitution which is largely a product of meddling foreigners trying to save themselves from Afghanistan by making it less Afghan, is an abysmal failure. Nonetheless, US officials have been at pains to distance themselves from the latest suggestion that the Afghan constitution should be revised, whatever views Afghans themselves may have on the subject, lest the Afghan president's pique interfere in their efforts to establish a Taliban office in Qatar and to begin political talks. The great irony in all of this is that, without a completely redrawn Afghan constitution, there will be no means of reaching a political accommodation with the Taliban even marginally acceptable to most Afghans - or to US officials themselves, for that matter.

Thus far, US efforts at peace making with the Taliban have been consonant with US efforts at war making with the Taliban: Both, they believe, are too important to be left to the Afghans. US officials generously allow that actual negotiations toward Afghan national reconciliation eventually will have to include the Afghan government, but their attitude and their actions do much to undermine whatever authority and credibility the Kabul regime might otherwise command. The Taliban, for its part, is happy to speak with the US, so long as they do not have to deal with a government which they consider a foreign invention. In fact, they have half a point, and the US, in apparent agreement, is willing to accommodate them. But as the final element in a political approach which could not be less viable if it were intentionally designed to fail, the US has at the same time established "red lines" for a final outcome which amount, in effect, to the moral equivalent of a Taliban surrender, including acceptance of the current Afghan constitution.

Solutions to a quagmire

If an Afghan reconciliation process is to have any chance of success, it will have to directly involve all the major Afghan political players, and sooner, rather than later. This will have to include leaders, such as those represented in the National Front for Afghanistan - often disparaged as "warlords" - who, unlike an Afghan president whose power relies largely on foreign troops and money, have authentic political weight. Moreover, any viable attempt at national reconciliation by the leading Afghan power blocs, to include those elements represented by the Taliban, will necessarily involve major changes to current political arrangements designed, among other things, to provide opportunities for the Taliban to participate in governance, while limiting their geographic reach to those areas where they can command genuine local support. Those who brand such arrangements a de-facto "partition" of the country are those most likely to benefit from Kabul's currently monopoly on power. The one thing that all Afghans seem to share is a common sense of Afghan identity.

The Taliban, for its part, does not seek political-sharing arrangements now, as they have deluded themselves into believing that they can conquer and run a centralised state on their own. In this, they are as captive to wishful thinking as Karzai and the US government. They will eventually be disabused of such ideas.

In the meantime, the US would be well advised to adopt a long-range view of what an achievable political outcome in Afghanistan might look like, and encourage the reforms, constitutional and otherwise, which would facilitate it - rather than focusing on short-term expedients and the ephemeral tantrums of a putative national leader whose current pretentions, if encouraged further, will ensure disaster for his country and its benefactors alike.

Robert Grenier is a retired, 27-year veteran of the CIA's Clandestine Service. He was Director of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Centre from 2004 to 2006.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

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I'll get 'nuked' for revealing Afghan failures, admits US army colonel

Whistleblower challenges Pentagon's official reports of peacekeeping mission in Taliban territory

The Independent
By Rupert Cornwell
Tuesday 07 February 2012
Washington

Hear it from the US Defence Department or the White House, and the war in Afghanistan is a success story allowing America to cease combat operations there a year early. Listen, however, to Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Davis, veteran of two tours on the Afghan frontlines, and the 11-year conflict is a failure bordering a disaster that those in power have deliberately concealed from Congress and the American people.

For the past month, Lt-Col Davis has been conducting an unusual one-man whistleblowing campaign, complete with two reports – one classified – to his superiors at the Pentagon and private briefings for lawmakers.

Now he has gone public, first in an article for a respected independent journal on military affairs, and then yesterday in an interview with The New York Times. It comes barely a week after Leon Panetta, the Defence Secretary, revealed plans for the last US combat troops to be out of Afghanistan by late 2013, compared with President Barack Obama's previous target of 2014.

"I'm going to get nuked," the 48-year-old officer told the newspaper, speaking of the reaction he expects to the accusations he is levelling at the Pentagon high command, and luminaries like General David Petraeus, who oversaw Mr Obama's troop surge in Afghanistan.

Lt-Col Davis likens himself to a latterday equivalent of James Stewart in Mr Smith Goes to Washington, the 1939 film about a senatorial innocent risking his career and reputation to take on a corrupt governing establishment.

In reality, he has a track record of dissent that goes back some years. But his current views stem from his experience in Afghanistan, where he travelled 9,000 miles across eight provinces last year, speaking with 250 soldiers across the ranks, and many Afghan security officials and civilians, before returning home in October last year. His judgement is that official reports of progress in the war are wildly overblown. The Taliban's strength, he contends, is undiminished, while the Afghan security forces have in many cases made their own deals with the rebels. "You can spin all kinds of stuff, but you can't spin the fact that more men are getting blown up every year."

Not surprisingly, the Pentagon rejects the charges, insisting it is a "values-based organisation", committed to "the integrity of what we publish and what we say". But, thus far at least, it has not moved to punish Lt-Col Davis – perhaps because he has drawn a degree of support on Capitol Hill.

In fact this is not the first time official public assessments of the war have been challenged. In December 2010, two classified intelligence reports warned that success was unlikely without a crackdown by Pakistan on insurgents in that country. And only last week, Dianne Feinstein, chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, spoke of the "disparity" between public pronouncements on the war, and the "sobering" conclusions of a National Intelligence Estimate – representing the combined wisdom of the US intelligence agencies – drawn up a month before.

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Reports on Afghanistan war too rosy? Army officer, others say yes.

An Army officer sets the Pentagon, Capitol Hill buzzing with a published complaint that US military leaders are not being honest about slow progress in the Afghanistan war. He's not the only doubter.

Christian Science Monitor
By Anna Mulrine, Staff writer
February 6, 2012
Washington

Are US military leaders being honest about how the war in Afghanistan is going? No – and to a troubling extent, argues an Army lieutenant colonel who served there last year.

In an article that is creating buzz in the halls of the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, Lt. Col. Daniel Davis argues that not only is the war in Afghanistan not going well, but also that his fellow US military officers – whether due to a misguided “can do” spirit or a fear of repercussions within their chains of command – are misleading the American people.

This apparent lack of candor, in turn, is creating what Davis calls a “credibility gap,” making it impossible to allow US citizens and lawmakers to “decide if the risk to blood and treasure” inherent in America’s wars is “worth it.”

IN PICTURES: Battling the Afghan insurgency

Published Sunday in Armed Forces Journal, produced by Gannett, “Truth, lies and Afghanistan: How military leaders have let us down” begins with Davis emphasizing that, upon his arrival in Afghanistan in late 2010, he was “sincerely hoping" to learn that Pentagon officials' consistent claims – "that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and the military were progressing towards self-sufficiency" – were true.

“I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured,” he writes, “but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.”

Instead, “I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.” He cites the inability of Afghan soldiers and police to handle security in many parts of the country, and the continued widespread influence of the Taliban.

“I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground,” he says, citing a 2011 report by an Afghan organization which noted that US military assessments routinely differ from those of other international military forces in the country and are “solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal.”

Defense analysts outside the Pentagon, for their part, have long grappled with disparities between official intelligence assessments and what they hear behind closed doors, but some argue that the tendency to “spin” is getting worse as US forces prepare to leave. “Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the US does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” writes Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a piece cited by Davis.

Last week, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D) of California, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, noted just such a gap, saying during a hearing that she was “concerned by what appears to be a disparity” in public testimony among Pentagon leaders about progress in Afghanistan and “the bleaker description” in classified intelligence reports.

Rather than deliberately mislead, military officers tend to emphasize the can-do spirit expected of career soldiers rather than problems that could be jeopardizing the war effort, when they are asked to speak publicly, some analysts note. Others may worry of the career-curbing impact of delivering news that those in power may not want to hear.

In many cases, US military leaders of the current wars have internalized a troubling lesson from Vietnam, argues Army Col. Paul Yingling: “If you can’t speak the truth, speak in truisms.”

Yingling, who wrote “A Failure in Generalship,” a widely regarded and widely discussed 2007 Armed Forces Journal article, cites his picks for the top truisms of the Afghanistan war:

* We’re making progress, though it’s uneven and uncertain. * There will be setbacks and hard fighting ahead. * Our hard-won progress is fragile and reversible. * The next six months are critical.

These oft-repeated phrases tend to produce eye-rolling among many who follow the war, because they have come to mean so little. “There are almost no conceivable circumstances in which they would not be true,” notes Yingling, in an e-mail. “No matter what happens, a senior leader can point to one of these truisms and claim, ‘I warned you.’ "

More troubling is that such truisms “justify continued fighting while minimizing the likelihood of anyone being held accountable for the results of such fighting,” Yingling adds.

For his part, Davis concludes in his article that a lack of candor is not patriotic, but rather ultimately does a disservice to the United States. When it comes time to decide whether to go to war – or whether to continue one – “our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth,” he writes. “That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years.”

The Pentagon has declined to comment on Davis's article.

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Afghans the losers in US election

The Age
February 7, 2012
Opinion

Barack Obama had been elected president, but not yet sworn in, when he asked to see the US's topmost military officer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, alone in Chicago.

The president-elect wanted an honest assessment of the state of America's wars. What was the degree of difficulty on Afghanistan, he asked the military chief, who at that time was Admiral Mike Mullen.

According to the book by the journalist Bob Woodward, Obama's Wars, Mullen replied that the Afghanistan war had been under-resourced for years. In truth, Mullen said, there was no strategy. That was November 21, 2008.

So, after seven years of occupation and warfare, the US apparently had no strategy, neither for itself nor for any of the 40 coalition countries which had followed it in.

Two months later, one of the top US commanders, General David Petraeus, was studying a voluminous internal review of the conduct of the war in Afghanistan.

Petraeus was intimate with the Iraq war; he was the US commander there. He had run the successful troop ''surge'' for the Bush administration. But now that he had been promoted to a position where he was responsible for both Iraq and Afghanistan as officer in charge of US Central Command, he needed urgent expertise in the Afghan war too.

He had one of his favourite analysts helping him study the Afghan review and turned to him for his conclusions. ''It is the blind leading the blind,'' reported Derek Harvey of the US Defence Intelligence Agency.

''We know too little about the enemy to craft a winning strategy,'' he reportedly told Petraeus. It was, according to Woodward, ''a forehead-smacking moment'' for Petraeus.

Through all this time, and despite any doubts they might have had, the political leadership in Australia and other allied nations resolutely defended the US and its strategy.

Under its new commander-in-chief, the US seemed to be taking a more serious approach. It revised the Afghan strategy and implemented a troop ''surge'' of an extra 33,000 soldiers on top of the existing 60,000.

At a major meeting of coalition leaders in Lisbon in November 2010, all the governments involved agreed to a firm commitment to keep their forces in Afghanistan until the end of 2014. At that point, the Afghan National Army should have enough trained troops to take over in full. It did seem the superpower was finally getting purposeful.

We now have to wonder just how serious the commitment was. First, Obama decided to withdraw all the surge troops on a timetable that meant they would have done combat duty in Afghanistan for only a single fighting season.

''We were losing the war with 60,000 US troops, and when we went up to 90,000 we started to win,'' a retired Australian major-general, Jim Molan, says.

Molan, incidentally, was a recipient of the ultimate US martial compliment. He was given command of the entire coalition combat operation in Iraq, including the American forces.

''By September this year we will have gone back to 60,000 with only a marginal increase in the competency of the Afghan National Army forces,'' Molan continues.

The US has said it will have drawn down its peak troop strength by the equivalent of all the surge forces of 33,000 by September - 10,000 already gone, and another 23,000 over the next eight months.

Molan makes the point that the fighting season only begins when the snow starts to melt around April or May. Aiming for a September withdrawal means that the 24,000 won't be available to fight. ''It will take three or four months to withdraw that many troops.''

''So,'' says Molan, ''we will go back to losing. And for no reason that one can surmise other than that Obama wants a one-liner in his stump speech - 'I have brought the surge home'.'' The US president faces the people in November this year.

When Obama announced this decision, a retired general of considerable standing, Jack Keane, told his protege, David Petraeus, by now the commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, that he should resign, according to a new book.

Why? Because the decision ''not only protracts the war but risks the mission,'' Paula Broadwell writes in All In: The Education of General David Petraeus, citing emails between the two men. Petraeus did not resign; Obama made him the new director of the CIA.

There is a second reason to doubt the seriousness of the Obama commitment. When an Afghan soldier shot and killed four unarmed French troops in Afghanistan last month, Nicolas Sarkozy panicked and announced that he would withdraw the 3600 French forces a year early. Sarkozy, too, faces an election.

This seems to have had quite an effect in Washington. Last week, and without any warning to US allies, the US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta, told reporters that the Obama administration wanted to shift in Afghanistan from ''a combat role to a training, advise and assist role … hopefully by mid to the latter part of 2013.'' This was universally interpreted as an accelerated withdrawal.

The leading Republican candidate to contest the presidency, Mitt Romney, pounced. The Obama administration was ''misguided'' and ''naive'' for signalling to the enemy a firm withdrawal date.

And US allies were unhappy too. Panetta's peers from Britain, Germany and other allies were reported to have challenged him in a ministerial meeting in Brussels on the weekend. They had all pledged to stay till the end of 2014. Around the world, it was a forehead-smacking moment.

Panetta hastily ''clarified'' his comment, assuring that the US would continue to provide combat support beyond mid-2013. Australia, throughout, has maintained its customary bristling defence of its great and powerful friend in every detail.

In the meantime, the US is facilitating negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government over a possible peace deal.

We are left to conclude that the Taliban is prepared to fight so long as they are alive, while the US appears to be prepared to fight as long as the short-term politics hold up. That is surely asymmetrical warfare. Have the leaders of the US ever taken this war seriously? Peter Hartcher is the Sydney Morning Herald international editor.

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Afghan security guard kills colleagues, police

Reuters
Tue Feb 7, 2012
KABUL

An Afghan security guard killed three colleagues and two police in southern Afghan city of Kandahar, the provincial authorities said on Tuesday.

"A member of a private security company (is) responsible for shooting his friends," the Kandahar media office said on its official Twitter feed. "(Two) ANP (police) were also killed and another one wounded after they intervened."

All of the victims were Afghans.

As of March 20 this year, private security firms will no longer be allowed to guard private premises.

All guard duties will be transferred to the Afghan Public Protection Force, a government-owned company which will be the sole supplier of guards to non-diplomatic and non-military operations in Afghanistan.

On Sunday, nine people were killed when a car bomb exploded in a busy area of Kandahar city.

Dozens of foreign soldiers have been killed in recent years by what NATO dubs the insider threat of "rogue" Afghan soldiers and police, complicating coalition efforts to train Afghanistan's army and police force before foreign combat troops leave by the end of 2014.

(Reporting by Mirwais Harooni and Daniel Magnowski; Editing by Nick Macfie)

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Hezb-e-Islami Delegation Pessimistic of Qatar Talks

TOLOnews.com
Monday, 06 February 2012

The Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekymatyar is pessimistic about peace negotiations in Qatar, Hekmatyar's delegation in Kabul said.

A delegation sent to Kabul by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said that if the negotiations have good results it will be in the benefit of the Afghanistan.

Negotiations between Hezb-e-Islami and the Afghan government have not led to any results.

"We pray and hope that these negotiations bring good will to our country," Ghayrat Baheer Head of Hezb-e-Islami's political office said. "As far as Afghan solution is concerned, all political parties and different ethnic groups of Afghanistan should take part."

A high ranking delegation of Hezb-e-Islami recently arrived in Kabul to talk with Afghan government, but no progress has been reported so far.

Mr Baheer said he hoped the talks would have a positive outcome.

He dismissed reports about surrender of Hezb-e-Islami members to the government.

"Afghans never surrender and Hezb-e-Islami not at all," he said.

Despite contacts between Hezb-e-Islami and Washington, no clear sign of progress has emerged.

Meanwhile, Leader of Change and Hope Coalition, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, has criticised the peace process arguing that neither Afghan political parties, nor civil society or the people in general are part of it. He said the Afghan government does not have a transparent programme for peace talks.

"Playing with the great wish of the Afghan people which is peace in the county is a political game. If a political game is played, whether at the regional or international level, it will not only lead to peace but will also distance us from peace," the Leader of Change and Hope Coalition said at a gathering in Kabul on Sunday.

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Afghan utopia becomes a much grimmer reality

Brisbane Times
February 7, 2012

A well-intentioned Australian project in Kabul has foundered on bureaucracy, corruption and lack of security, writes Rory Callinan.

It was envisaged as an Afghan utopia for returned asylum seekers - a purposebuilt housing estate with running water, jobs, schools and small businesses on the outskirts of the capital, Kabul.

Funded by Australian taxpayers for about $8 million, the AliceGhan project was to provide 1400 homes for more than 10,000 refugees, some of whom were expected to have returned voluntarily from Australia.

Residents were to be trained in construction techniques and paid as they built their homes.

Women would have access to trade and vocational training to develop income-generating life skills and would even have a childcare centre as part of the project, for which the United Nations would be the delivery agent.

But when the Australian officials planning the project couldn't even visit the country because of security problems, warning bells probably should have started ringing.

Last year, the Immigration Minister, Chris Bowen, described the six-year-old project, conceived under the Howard government, as a ''substantial and a successful one''.

He said it was being considered for more funding as part of an agreement with Afghanistan to accept refugees returning involuntarily.

But from interviews conducted last week at AliceGhan, about 50 kilometres north of Kabul, and documents released under freedom of information laws, the Herald has found the project was handicapped by problems from the start and key objectives have not been achieved, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars.

Asked last week about extra funding planned for the project, the Immigration Department said no more would be spent until water supply issues had been resolved.

The decision to halt further funding comes as the Australian government is spending $165 million on aid projects in Afghanistan in 2011-12, according to figures from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

When the Herald visited the snow-covered site, it found most of the programs and their trainees and potential jobs were non-existent and more than 600 of the 1025 houses were still vacant and falling into disrepair.

Money spent installing a permanent water supply and pipeline appeared to have been wasted, with freezing residents queuing with buckets in the snow and ice to get their supplies from a water tanker.

"People don't come here to live because of no electricity, water, clinic or work,'' said Fazel Mohammad Attaee, the headmaster at the only school.

Immigration Department and UN documents released under FOI reveal officials had ample warning of the problems.

From the start, the planning meetings involving immigration officials and Afghan politicians had to be held as far away as India.

''Since signing of the [record of understanding, immigration] officers have made numerous attempts to travel to Kabul to progress the housing project, but because of the deterioration in security conditions, have been prevented from travelling,'' said the information brief to the then immigration minister, Amanda Vanstone.

But the meeting issue was nothing compared with some of the others that soon emerged.

During the project's development, there was an attempt to bomb aid workers as well as problems with land claims from neighbouring communities, fake refugees, squatters, a row over water rights and corrupt police seeking bribes from contractors.

In 2007, the water supply issue was signalled after the location was changed and Australian officials started warning of problems on the landmine-infested site.

''Progress has been made in implementing the allocation project but new and potentially problematic challenges continue to emerge,'' Australian embassy officials cabled Canberra on June 19, 2007.

By late July the cables warned that the project was ''running behind schedule'' and by August, a cable titled ''Mounting concern at delays'' was sent to Australia.

Four months later the then ambassador Brett Hackett wrote that the project was proceeding at a ''frustratingly slow pace'' and tough decisions were needed ''concerning aspects of the project which will not proceed''.

By 2008, a UN quarterly project report admitted that significant problems in selecting the right beneficiaries had allowed ''many families who did not meet the eligibility criteria to gain assistance through the project''.

Of 674 candidates, 101 applicants were found to be ineligible while 41 of the interlopers had started building homes on the site, the report said.

Many of the ineligible beneficiaries refused to leave and at least twice threatened project staff with violence if they were forced out, the report said.

Residents or squatters also proved a problem by claiming ownership of some of the land and authorities said five residents had built structures. ''Attempts to remove these ineligible beneficiaries from the site have been met with resistance,'' said the UN report.

Officials later conceded that some who had already built structures could stay.

In September 2008, in a sign of increasing tensions, a landmine was placed near the AliceGhan site on an unsealed road used regularly by a non-government organisation for water transport.

Another flaw was the proposed requirement for potential residents to learn construction skills by building their homes.

Officials found nearly all the beneficiaries hired contract labourers to build their houses, which undermined the objective.

Corruption was also a problem. In mid-2008 a UN quarterly progress report revealed local police were stopping contractors and demanding large sums of money.

In 2009 a neighbouring community laid claim to the project's water supply, which was to have been piped 6 kilometres from deep wells at an estimated cost of more than $2 million.

About 250 families live at the project and residents said some classes were being held for training but they had not led to jobs. Other promised facilities had not materialised.

The AliceGhan council secretary, Amir Mohammad Amiri, said the Australian ambassador had visited last year.

"People of the area really warmly welcomed her. She checked the water storage and the town. She promised to help but nothing was helped.''

A resident, Hazrat Mir, who is a mason, said: "People have no other option but to live here. They are poor and there is no other place to go and live.

''If they leave this area, they can't come back. They have already spent time and money on houses here."

The Immigration Department spokesman said extra funding would be considered only when a suitable water supply had been established by the UN Development Program and the Afghan government.

He said the water supply was delayed by a land dispute between the government and the community that owns the water resources and the Afghan government was working to resolve the issue.

A spokesman for Mr Bowen said the project had been planned and started by the previous government.

The spokesman said the Gillard government remained committed to the project despite the difficulties.

The government was working "hard with the UNDP and the government of Afghanistan to overcome existing hurdles and bring the project to its potential, and continues to monitor its progress carefully,'' he said.

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Isaf Welcomes US -Taliban Talks

TOLOnews.com
By Sharif Amiry
Monday, 06 February 2012

Isaf welcomes any kind of negotiation that brings stability in Afghanistan, General Carsten Jacobson said at a press conference on Monday.

At the same time Nato urges the international community to help Afghanistan in security sector beyond 2014.

Isaf did not provide further information about talks between the US and the Taliban.

"All are aware that there are a number of messages sent to every moment around the political process that leads to reconciliation and that's welcomed by Isaf," General Jacobson said.

Nato stresses that there will be no reason for Afghan forces to collapse after 2014.

"It's clear that after 2014 the international community particularly at the Bonn conference has expressed it's continuing commitments to Afghanistan and we would expect that also include the security area as well," Nato's Senior Civilian Representative's Spokesman Dominic Medley, said.

Nato spokesman said that a part of the Afghan Army, particularly the Afghan special forces are world class.

"Some of your own Afghan army now are world class, particularly in the field of the special forces," he added.

This comes as recently there were reports that Nato member countries are considering a decrease in the number of Afghan security forces due to lack of enough budget to provide after 2014.

Meanwhile, the US Defence Secretary, Leon Pannetta has urged the international community to stand by Afghanistan after 2014 and build a strong force to be capable of defending the country.

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NATO: From military alliance to talk shop?

CNN
February 6th, 2012

France intends to withdraw its troops from NATO-led operations in Afghanistan by 2013. This is earlier than the previously agreed deadline of 2014. This announcement, coupled with signs that other allies - including the United States - may be rushing to leave Afghanistan, threatens to humiliate the alliance, with severe consequences for trans-Atlantic security.

Every generation of Western politicians has dreaded the possibility of NATO's demise. In the 1960s, governments assumed that the anti-Americanism generated by the Vietnam War would tear the alliance apart. A decade later, there were worries that detente would produce the same result. When the Cold War ended, politicians feared that the 'glue' provided by the Soviet threat would disappear. Yet NATO defied these predictions and survived with an increased membership and enhanced reputation.

Still, pessimists claim that recent conflicts raise much more difficult questions about the future of the organisation. In Libya, for the first time, the United States pushed NATO into a military operation, but then took a back seat, leaving it to the Europeans to do most of the fighting.

In Afghanistan, the alliance waded into a conflict without a clear idea of what it wanted to accomplish, inadequate coordination between contributing nations and almost no discussion about the endgame. The result was heavy casualties and huge political tensions. There is a real danger that countries will follow the French example and 'rush for the exit' in Afghanistan; a botched NATO-led war could turn into a debacle that might seal the alliance's fate.

However, this is unlikely to be the outcome. Far from considering it a failure, the U.S. administration regards the Libya operation as precisely the kind of division of labor which the alliance will apply in future conflicts: NATO will act as a conduit for resources required by a group of countries that feel threatened enough to commit their forces.

Afghanistan is a trickier problem, but not one which should destroy NATO. Provided governments coordinate their withdrawal - still the most likely outcome, despite the French announcement - and provided the Afghan government survives for a decent interval afterwards, NATO should emerge relatively unscathed. Even the Soviet-installed puppet regime in Afghanistan survived for two years after that withdrawal, and there is no reason why a similar scenario could not happen now. Furthermore, no member-state wants to engage in recriminations, if only because none wishes to admit that its own casualties in Afghanistan were in vain.

NATO as such is unlikely to disappear - if only because, as the Libya operation showed, Europe's Common Security and Defense Policy is not and cannot be an alternative to the alliance. The Europeans will not acquire any capabilities to conduct autonomous military operations, so they will need logistical support and access to enormous U.S. military capabilities.

The United States itself is unlikely to give up on the alliance; it has no comparable multinational military structure anywhere else in the world. However, the alliance will increasingly become a looser 'talking shop' where security issues are debated but not necessarily resolved.

While NATO members disagree as to its future role, none has any interest in disintegration. Although stresses within the alliance will come up at the NATO summit in May in Chicago, the alliance will survive - at a minimum as a venue for articulating political controversies, and probably in a more organized way than before.

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Afghan interpreters to get second chance to come to Canada

Toronto Star
By Bruce Campion-Smith Ottawa Bureau chief
Mon Feb 06 2012
OTTAWA

More than 100 Afghan citizens who put their lives on the line to help Canada’s Afghanistan mission are getting a second chance to resettle here.

The Prime Minister’s Office has quietly ordered the federal immigration department to review the cases of Afghan citizens who helped Canadian diplomats and soldiers in Kandahar and Kabul — often at great personal risk — but were snubbed in their bids to come to Canada, the Star has learned.

The news could mean that Sayed Shah Sharifi, an interpreter whose story has been featured in the Star, could get another shot at coming to Canada. His initial application had been rejected, even though his service to the Canadian military won him accolades.

The surprise review comes amidst criticism that the Conservative government had betrayed a promise of Canadian citizenship to Afghans who had worked alongside Canadians on the battlefield.

As well, Harper’s office has removed one contentious criterion that had been seen as a roadblock to many Afghans seeking to make a new life in Canada, according to a source familiar with the file.

No longer will applicants have to demonstrate they face “extraordinary and individualized risk and serious injury” because of their service to Canadian troops, a subjective evaluation that prevented two-thirds of the candidates from qualifying.

While the resettlement program had dangled the promise of Canadian citizenship for Afghans who aided Canadians troops and diplomats during their Kandahar mission, many of those applications in fact had been rejected out of hand.

Among those was Sharifi, a 23-year-old combat interpreter, whose bid to come to Canada was rejected even though he had served the Canadian mission for the required 12 months and had won accolades from the military.

Yet the government officials who reviewed his application doubted his claims that Taliban insurgents want to kill him as retribution. Sharifi said he had been hunted by insurgents on motorcycles because of his work with the Canadian military.

Immigration Minister Jason Kenney announced in 2009 that he wanted to protect Afghans who could show “individual risk” because they had worked with Canadians in Kandahar. In return for their work, they would be offered fast-track immigration processing to come to Canada.

Yet the program became bogged down in bureaucratic delays and as of Dec. 31, 2011, only 97 applicants, plus their family members, had actually made the move to Canada.

But before Christmas, the order came down quietly from the Prime Minister’s Office to take another look at the cases that had been turned aside.

Those instructions are to review rejected files and accept Afghan nationals, such as interpreters, cultural advisers and others who can show proof that they worked with Canadians for at least 12 months.

“Obviously it flowed down from the political leadership to change the program,” said one source familiar with the issue.

Then, at a meeting last month of Ottawa’s Afghanistan Task Force — a committee of departments involved in the country, such as the RCMP, the defence department, foreign affairs and development — immigration officials revealed that changes were afoot to the program at the behest of the PMO.

They proposed a review of rejected applications and relaxed criteria that could offer hope to those already in the pipeline.

By the end of January, 159 files were under active review, the Star has learned. Decisions will be made by Feb. 15 on who is eligible, and those accepted will have to arrive in Canada no later than July 1.

While the program is not accepting new applications, there have been questions about trying to reach interpreters who didn’t apply the first time but might now have a shot under the revised criteria.

A spokesperson for Immigration Minister Jason Kenney declined to comment whether a fresh review was underway in the department.

“The government of Canada has now received all applications under this program. Many of them remain under review. We will not comment on operational matters for ongoing programs,” Candice Malcolm said.

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Pakistan much more important than Afghanistan: US expert

Business Recorder (blog)
By HASSAN ABBAS
February 07, 2012

A US expert has said that America supports every government in Pakistan that serves its purposes.

He also said that America uses Pakistan for its own benefit and Pakistan always tries to use America for its own purposes.

Professor of International Relations and Terrorism Studies at Kings College London, Professor Anatol Leiven expressed these views in a talk organised by Oxford University Press to discuss the subject of his book "Pakistan: A Hard Country", here on Monday.

Leiven said he does not agree with the perception that America always supports dictators in Pakistan, but America always supports those rulers that support it.

He further said US did not support General Zia but they started supporting him after Soviet intervention in the same way they supported Musharraf after 9/11.

He also said America did not support Pakistan in 1965 or Kargil War.

The expert termed Pakistan Army the most disciplined institution in the country but said it 'does not mean he supports the idea of running government by the army'.

He appreciated Pakistan's role in war against terror, especially the operation carried by Army in Swat.

Speaking about Afghan situation, Leiven, who is also the senior fellow of New American Foundation in Washington DC, said 'Pakistan is much more important than Afghanistan'.

In his speech, he also analysed Pakistan as a state and its political system and explained how those factors, which give the state its surprising resilience in the face of revolution also hold it back in terms of economy and other issues.

Speaking about his book, Leiven highlighted that far from seeing Pakistan as the failed state as often portrayed in media, the book treats it as viable and coherent state within the limits and standards of its own region.

Managing Director Oxford University Press, Ameena Saiyid said Leiven's objective and profound analysis of Pakistani problems makes his work a prominent contribution among the many books that dealing with the issue.

The evening also featured a stimulating discussion between Anatol Lieven and Commissioning Editor OUP, Dr Yaqoob Bangash.

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Taliban Leader Captured in Helmand, Isaf Says

TOLOnews.com
Tuesday, 07 February 2012

A Taliban leader was captured in a joint operation conducted by Afghan and Coalition security troops in southern Helmand province on Tuesday, Isaf said.

"In Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, an Afghan and coalition security force captured a Taliban leader during an operation today," Isaf said in a statement.

The leader moved supplies for fighters and directed an insurgent cell specialising in bomb attacks throughout the province, it said.

One additional suspected insurgent was detained during the operation, it added.

Meanwhile, the statement said that Afghan and coalition forces captured a Taliban facilitator during an operation in Arghandab district of Kandahar province today.

The facilitator supplied insurgents with explosives for use in attacks throughout Arghandab district. Two suspected insurgents were detained during the operation.

In Maiwand district of Kandahar province, an Afghan and coalition security force conducted an operation in search of a Taliban leader today.

The leader conducted direct-fire and roadside bomb attacks. Multiple suspected insurgents were detained during the operation.

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Sorry, Mitt: It Won't Be an American Century

American politicians should stop pretending the United States runs the world.

Foreign Policy
BY CHARLES KUPCHAN
FEBRUARY 6, 2012

"This century must be an American century," Mitt Romney insisted in a recent speech on foreign policy. "In an American century," the former Massachusetts governor continued, "America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world." Adhering to his party's traditional playbook, the likely Republican nominee went on to reaffirm that the United States is "an exceptional country with a unique destiny."

In an election season, such talk rolls easily off the tongue. But Romney's hackneyed rhetoric is woefully out of step -- both with an American electorate hungry for a less costly brand of foreign policy and with a world in the midst of tectonic change. A sharp economic downturn and expensive, inconclusive conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have left Americans ready for a focus on the home front. Abroad, the charge for the next U.S. president can hardly be to stick his head in the sand and deny that the global distribution of power is fast changing. On the contrary, it is to react soberly and steadily to the implications of such change and ensure that the United States remains secure and prosperous even as economic and military strength spreads to new quarters.

President Barack Obama is on the correct path. Leaving Iraq and overseeing a paced withdrawal from Afghanistan will bring U.S. commitments back into line with U.S. interests. Special operations and drone strikes have proved far more effective in fighting al Qaeda than has occupying countries in the Middle East and South Asia, and an offshore posture in the Persian Gulf is the best way to deal with Iran. Amid China's rise and the economic dynamism building in its neighborhood, Obama is right to downsize the U.S. presence in Europe and orchestrate a strategic "pivot" to East Asia. The move constitutes a necessary hedge against Chinese ambition and ensures that American workers will benefit from expanding markets in the Pacific Rim. These policies will enable the United States to simultaneously adjust to a shifting global landscape, husband its resources, and grow its economy -- facilitating the president's pledge to focus on "nation-building here at home."

Romney has already denigrated Obama's pragmatism, charging that "our president thinks America is in decline." Obama shot back in his State of the Union address on Jan. 24 that "anyone who tells you that America is in decline … doesn't know what they're talking about." Obama decidedly has the upper hand in this back-and-forth. He recognizes that, the country's strengths notwithstanding, U.S. strategy must adjust to a world in which power will be more broadly distributed. And his focus on rebuilding the American economy speaks directly to an electorate yearning for more equity and prosperity at home.

According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, 46 percent of Americans want the United States to "mind its own business," and 76 percent think the country should "concentrate more on our own national problems" than on foreign challenges. These are high numbers by historical standards -- a clear indication that the electorate is hurting economically and wary of strategic overreach. Romney should take note. His chest-thumping talk of a new American century still plays well in some quarters. But Obama's commitment to nation-building at home will play even better.

Even if Romney's rhetoric were to get more domestic traction, it would still bear no resemblance to the new global landscape that is fast emerging. The United States is indeed an exceptional nation -- in its prized geographic location, commitment to freedom and democracy, and brand of international leadership. But the country's exceptionalism should not be used as an excuse to hide from global realities.

China's GDP will catch up with America's over the course of the next decade. The World Bank predicts that the dollar, euro, and China's renminbi will become co-equals in a "multi-currency" monetary system by 2025. Goldman Sachs expects the collective GDP of the top four developing countries -- Brazil, China, India, and Russia -- to match that of the G-7 countries by 2032. The United States will no doubt exit the current slump and bounce back economically in the years ahead. Nonetheless, a more level global playing field is inevitable.

To be sure, America's military superiority will remain second to none for decades to come. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made amply clear, though, military primacy hardly ensures effective influence. And with the U.S. defense budget poised to shrink in the service of restoring the country's fiscal health, the United States will have to pick its fights carefully. Shrewd and judicious statecraft will be at least as important as raw power in ensuring the country's security.

To acknowledge the need for the United States to adjust to prospective shifts in the global distribution of power is not, as Duke University professor Bruce Jentleson recently pointed out in Democracy, to be a declinist or a pessimist. It is to be a realist. And safely guiding the United States through this coming transition requires seeing the world as it is rather than retreating toward the illusory comfort of denial.

Adjusting to the rise of the rest requires, for starters, making more room at the table for newcomers. That process is already well under way. The G-20 has supplanted the G-8, widening the circle for global consultations. In the aftermath of reforms adopted in 2010, developing countries now have enhanced weight at the World Bank and IMF. The enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, though currently bogged down in wrangling, is also in the offing.

But making international institutions more representative is the easy part. More challenging will be managing the ideological diversity that will accompany the coming realignment in global power. Precisely because the United States is an exceptional nation, its version of liberal democracy may well prove to be the exception, not the rule.

In China, Russia, and the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, state-led brands of capitalism are holding their own -- and may well do so for the foreseeable future. The Arab Spring could finally bring democratic rule to at least some countries in the Middle East, but it is also breeding political Islam; democratization should not be mistaken for Westernization. Even emerging powers that are already democracies, such as India, Brazil, and Turkey, are charting their own paths. They regularly break with the United States and Europe on trade, Middle East diplomacy, military intervention, the environment, and other issues, preferring to side with other ascending states, whether democratic or not. Romney's paeans to American power are no excuse for his silence on how he plans to manage these complexities.

Promoting international stability will grow more demanding as rising powers bring to the table their differing conceptions of order and governance. The United States has a key role to play in managing such diversity and channeling it toward cooperative ends. Overheated proclamations of American preeminence, however, will do more harm than good. If a new, consensual international order is to emerge, rising powers must be treated as stakeholders in that order, not merely as objects of American power.

Shepherding the transition to this more pluralistic world is arguably the defining challenge facing U.S. statecraft in the years ahead. Romney appears ready to pave over this challenge by denying that such change is afoot and attempting to portray Obama's policies as "an eloquently justified surrender of world leadership."

Obama should welcome this debate and refuse to let his opponents hide behind the veil of American exceptionalism. Democrats no longer need to feel vulnerable on national security; Obama has demonstrated smarts and strength on many issues, including the degradation of al Qaeda, the pivot to Asia, and the isolation of Iran. He understands that agile, firm diplomacy backed by American power will do much more for the United States than congratulatory talk of American primacy.

A smarter, more selective, and less costly U.S. role in the world would not only help the United States get its own house in order, but also give rising powers the wider berth they seek. And good policy would also be good politics; Americans are keen to share with others the burdens and responsibilities of international engagement. The world desperately needs a brand of U.S. leadership that focuses not on ruling the roost, but on guiding a more diverse and unwieldy globe to consensus and cooperation.

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Pakistani Minister Urges Reopening Border to NATO

AP
February 7, 2012
ISLAMABAD

Pakistan's defense minister says the country should reopen its Afghan border crossings to NATO troop supplies after negotiating a better deal with the coalition.

Pakistan closed the crossings over two months ago in response to American airstrikes that accidentally killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.

Defense Minister Ahmad Mukhtar said on Tuesday that the government should negotiate new "terms and conditions" with NATO and then reopen the border.

He did not provide details. But other Pakistani officials have said the government should levy additional fees on NATO for using the route through the country.

About 30 percent of non-lethal supplies for U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan traveled through Pakistan before the border closed.

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Nato Helicopter Crashes in Eastern Afghanistan

TOLOnews.com
Monday, 06 February 2012

Nato says one of its helicopters has crashed in eastern Afghanistan on Monday but no one killed in the incident.

Nato said in a statement that the crew has been taken to a nearby base.

Initial reports indicate no enemy activity in the area of Monday's crash, the statement.

The cause of the crash has yet to be determined.

Nato did not provide any information on injures.

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US colonel: Don't believe US statements on progress in Afghanistan

Lt. Col. Daniel Davis just finished a year in Afghanistan and says don't believe claims of progress.

Christian Science Monitor
By Dan Murphy, Staff writer
February 6, 2012

I spent five years covering the Iraq war, and at the end of it I was not inclined to believe anything official spokesmen had to say about Iraq anymore. I heard denials an insurgency was erupting in 2003, watched President Bush's "mission accomplished" moment after Saddam Hussein was captured, and was earnestly told Iraq's insurgency was on its last legs in 2005.

Again and again, the gap between observed reality and official rhetoric was wider than the ocean. I've only taken one reporting trip to Afghanistan, but follow the story from a distance and know many reporters who have lived there for years. Most of them believe, much as the Baghdad press corps did back in the day, that military spokesmen are running an information operation, not a clearing house for facts and honest opinion.

Now a colonel who just finished his tour in Afghanistan is backing that position up, in some of the most candid and critical comments you'll ever read from a serving officer. Many are certain to disagree with Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis' conclusions in Truth, lies, and Afghanistan. But his argument against continuing the war there is as straight and clear as a tracer bullet, particularly coming from a serving officer.

Davis spent most of last year in Afghanistan working with the Army's Rapid Equipping Force, a job he says took him "into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces. What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground."

He writes: "I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level." He also reports low moral among soldiers, doubtful the risks they're taking are doing much good, and incidents of Afghan soldiers trained and equipped by the US working with the Taliban.

The assessment differs sharply with the tone of progress emerging from the top brass. For instance, a press release from the end of January from the US Department of Defense information office begins:

"Almost a month into 2012 -- a year both Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen, the top commander in Afghanistan, called pivotal to operations there -- International Security Assistance Force officials said last year’s accomplishments have set the stage for continued success."

But Colonel Davis provides a different assessment from those on the ground. He recounts a conversation in September he held with an Afghan official who serves as a cultural adviser to the US commander in Kunar Province. Davis asked him if Afghan security forces would be able to hold out against the Taliban when US troops withdraw from the province.

“No. They are definitely not capable," the adviser told him. "Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them."

Davis also echoes John Kerry's famous question to Congress in 1971 after serving in Vietnam: "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?"

"How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by US senior leaders in Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan. But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on."

Colonel Davis, who did a previous combat tour in Afghanistan during 2005-2006 and in Iraq from 2008-2009 was clearly shaken by what he saw this go around. His public statements are unusual in the extreme for a serving officer. In case you missed the link to his piece in the Armed Forces Journal the first time, here it is again.

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Paratrooper faces charges for punching Taliban insurgent

A paratrooper who served with distinction in Iraq and Afghanistan is facing legal action for hitting a member of the Taliban in the face as he tried to escape in a firefight, it was reported.

Telegraph.co.uk
By Donna Bowater
07 Feb 2012

The solder, who has served along with the special forces and is known only as Corporal C, is likely to face lengthy and costly military court proceedings even though the Afghan has refused to make a complaint.

There were no other witnesses to the punch, which came after the man had approached a patrol as a passenger on a motorcycle. His partner pulled a gun on a member of the Afghan National Army and was shot dead.

Ahmed Wali denied he was a member of the Taliban when he was questioned by Corporal C but prosecutors admitted his evidence was "unreliable".

Corporal C, 31, who has left the forces out of disgust at his treatment, is now due to appear at a court martial later this month despite three appeal court judges expressing concerns about the case.

Last year, they described the prosecution as "a large hammer [to deal] with a relatively minor matter", according to the Daily Mail.

The legal action is thought to have cost £250,000 already even though legal experts have said it is unlikely Corporal C, from Glasgow, will be convicted over the incident that happened in March 2010.

The soldier, who served with the Parachute Regiment, admitted hitting Wali but said: "I just wanted to save lives. So in my frustration I hit him. It was an instant punch with my left fist. I didn't swing at him."

Friends said the decision to take him to court was "absurd".

One told the Mail: "He is a young British paratrooper who has risked his life and was doing his duty.

"There is no other point of this prosecution than political correctness. He should be seen as a hero, not facing the prospect of his good name in tatters."

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