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AKHBAR TOLO (TOLO News)
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14 February 2012
FEATURE STORY
Kabul Risks Political Meltdown
BUSINESS
No articles featured today
NATION
Taliban are Terrorists and the Murderers of Afghan People: Spanta
Afghan Report Blames NATO for Airstrike That Killed Children
Leaving Afghan Development in the Wrong Hands
Security vs. Reconciliation: The Afghan Conundrum
Afghanistan combat outpost 'Aryan' draws protest
Dozens of Insurgents Surrender to Afghan Authorities
Can the Afghan army take the lead in battle?
White House Proposes Cap on Wartime Spending
Afghan Taliban demands Pakistan explains former minister's death
Afghanistan: What Explains Taliban Staying Power?
New wave of troops deploy to Afghanistan as part of NATO training mission
6 Insurgents Killed in Clashes with Afghan Police
Afghan civilians carry the burden
Two Officers Counter Bleak Assessment of Afghan War
How Not to Withdraw From Afghanistan
Civilian Casualties is a Tragedy: Isaf
Envoy Reiterates Iran's Continued Support for Afghanistan
Did the United States use the Kashmir earthquake to send intelligence operatives into Pakistan?
Investigation Launched Over $42m Hospital Embezzlement
Parliament to decide fate of Nato supply lines: Kayani
19 Taliban surrender in western Afghan province
PRESS RELEASES
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FEATURE STORY
Kabul Risks Political Meltdown
New York Times
By HAROUN MIR
Op-Ed Contributor
February 13, 2012
The assessment of NATO’s decade-long mission in Afghanistan looks grim compared with the amount of sacrifice in blood and in treasure. But if we compare today’s Afghanistan to the time when the Taliban ruled, we recognize considerable improvements in many aspects of life, especially human rights, education, health care, the economy, and media freedom. The biggest concern for us is how to make these achievements sustainable and irreversible after 2014, even as the threat of political meltdown in Kabul looms large.
Many in my country and in the region still remember the Geneva Accords of 1988, which led to the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan. But a peaceful handover of political power was thwarted by regional spoilers, namely Pakistan and Iran, which still have the same ill intentions and the capacity to destroy the gains that we have acquired since the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001.
The renewed international commitment to Afghanistan for the decade from 2014 to 2024, announced at the Bonn conference in December, and the U.S. military’s determination to keep a significant footprint in the country after 2014 have helped reduce ambiguity about the fate of Afghanistan. But a rapidly deteriorating security and political situation makes us less optimistic about the capacity of the Afghan government to contain the situation within the next two years. Of particular concern are the challenges of the security transition, reconciliation with the Taliban, and the transfer of political power from President Hamid Karzai to the next leader in early 2014.
Meanwhile, the insurgents will preserve their strength by avoiding direct confrontation with NATO forces and will rely on terrorist attacks against both foreign and Afghan forces. They have been able to inflict ever more casualties on NATO forces by using low-tech roadside bombs and suicide attacks. And their campaign of targeted political assignation has created panic among Afghan political leaders and senior government officials.
Similarly, the Pakistani and Iranian spy agencies will increase their subversive activities in the country to try to prevent a successful security transition and a peaceful transfer of political power in 2014. There has been ample evidence of their support for the Taliban, and the recent leak of NATO documents accusing the Pakistani military of aiding the Taliban appears to prove that Pakistan is involved in a proxy war against NATO in Afghanistan.
In addition, the Afghan government has lost direction, and President Karzai has become politically isolated at home and abroad. He has lost the support of his main coalition partners within the Northern Alliance leadership; he has been sidelined from the peace talks by the Taliban, who prefer direct talks with the U.S. administration; and he has been unable to improve his relationship with the Obama administration.
Political uncertainty in Afghanistan suddenly increased with the revelation of U.S. secret talks with the Taliban and the opening of a Taliban political office in Qatar. Northern Alliance leaders, who do not consider Karzai’s government a party to the negotiations, traveled in early January to Berlin to discuss decentralization of political power in Afghanistan with a number of U.S. congressmen. Further political fragmentation in Kabul and growing mistrust between Karzai and Washington will embolden the Taliban, who will drag out the peace negotiations until 2014, when they will be in a position of strength vis-à-vis the Afghan government and the U.S. military.
The recent announcement by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta about transferring security responsibility to the Afghans by 2013 seems unrealistic. Afghan forces will not be able to take the lead role in the next two years. The southern half of the country, except for a few big cities, will fall under Taliban control by 2014. Thus the country could split into a north and a south.
The survival of the regime in Kabul depends on the U.S. military presence and international financial assistance rather than on the loyalty of its security forces and the support of Afghans. An unsuccessful military transition and a failed constitutional transfer of power in 2014 could cause a political meltdown in Kabul, leading to a power vacuum and the absence of a central government.
Haroun Mir is director of Afghanistan’s Center for Research and Policy Studies.
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BUSINESS
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NATION
Taliban are Terrorists and the Murderers of Afghan People: Spanta
TOLOnews.com
Monday, 13 February 2012
National Security Advisor to President Karzai, in an Exclusive Interview with TOLOnews, said that Taliban are the murderers of Afghan people and are servants of foreigners.
Mr Spanta said one should not expect humane behaviour from the Taliban.
He said if government tries to bring Taliban to power, he will feel ashamed to being part of it.
Killing is the art of the Taliban and if anyone calls Taliban leaders as "heroes", will be a traitor and enemy of Afghanistan, Mr Spanta continued.
Taliban's aim is to impose medieval culture on contemporary era.
"If government tries to bring Taliban into power and ignore our achievements, I want to say from now that I am feel ashamed before history," Mr Spanta said.
He emphasised that Afghan government should not lose the war it's winning, with Taliban's propaganda.
Mr Spanta believes that the Taliban can be considered the main problem for Afghanistan in the last 10 years.
He called Hezbe Islami an easy party to talk to, but said that government should talk with main players of the Afghan crisis.
He called Taliban's Qatar office only an address to the militant group, and not a political office.
"This office is only an address for talking to the Taliban, and it can in no way be seen as recognition of the Taliban," he added.
He called corruption a major challenge ahead of the Afghan government. Existence of corruption has paved the way for the enemies of Afghanistan to misuse it.
He once again emphasised on Afghan-owned Peace process and said Afghanistan will not sacrifice the past achievements.
The statements come as Afghan government recently agreed to establishment of Taliban's Qatar office.
The Taliban group has also shown its readiness for talks with the US government and it's Western allies.
Release of Taliban leaders from Guantanamo Bay prison has been Taliban main pre-condition for talks.
Recently Afghan government expressed it's agreement to transfer of Taliban prisoners to Qatar to join their families.
It came as Pakistani media reported that the talks between the US and the Taliban have ended without result.
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Afghan Report Blames NATO for Airstrike That Killed Children
New York Times
By ALISSA J. RUBIN and SHARIFULLAH SAHAK
February 13, 2012
KABUL, Afghanistan
Seven children and a young adult were killed in a NATO airstrike last week as they grazed their sheep and goats in a snowy area of eastern Afghanistan, according to Afghan government officials who announced the findings of their investigation into the strike on Monday.
The strike occurred after a dawn clearing operation by NATO troops in a nearby village on Feb. 8, said Mohammed Tahir Safi, an adviser to President Hamid Karzai, who led the committee that investigated the civilian casualties.
“I call on human rights community and the world community: Who will speak up for the rights of these children?” he said. “Will you take the rights of these children?”
Mr. Safi held up photographs of what he said were the victims. Most looked like boys between the ages of 11 and 15. Their faces were bloodied and in at least one case the eye and side of the face was partially gone from the blast. The boys all appeared to be lying on white sheets. He said that one of the victims was between 18 and 20 years old, but that the rest were much younger.
The investigating committee, which traveled with NATO officers to the site of the attack in a remote, snowbound area, included representatives of the Afghan security forces as well as local elders and politicians.
NATO is investigating the deaths but has not yet determined whether it was responsible or who was killed, and how the strike came about, said Lt. Col. Jimmie E. Cummings, a NATO spokesman.
“We were engaging a group of armed men that we observed engaging in unusual behavior,” said Colonel Cummings.
The attack was “in accordance with our tactical directives,” he added, referring to the rules of engagement used by NATO troops.
“Afterwards additional casualties were discovered,” he said. “We have a thorough assessment going to discover how those casualties came about.”
Unlike many civilian casualties that are caused by NATO troops and occur at night, this one appears to have happened during daylight hours, according to local villagers. It is unclear whether there were Taliban in the area or other insurgents. Local government officials have said that there are gun runners in the district, but not Taliban.
One of the villagers, who works as a police chief in a nearby district, lost his 12-year-old son, Ajmal, and two nephews, ages 9 and 11. The police officer, Abdul Zahid, described the area as deeply poor with almost no services of any kind.
“We don’t have paved roads, school or a clinic in Gayawa,” he said. “There’s almost one meter snow here in our village and we send our children to take care of the goats and sheep and feed them and collect firewood from the trees nearby and bring it home so we can heat our homes.”
On Feb. 8 when the bombing happened, the children had gone as usual to the grazing area outside the village. They had just finished letting the animals graze and had made a small fire to keep warm when they were bombed, he said.
“Suddenly some airplanes came and dropped bombs on the children and killed my son, my two nephews and some other children from our village,” said Mr. Zahid. “When we went there we saw the children in pieces, some missing legs, some missing arms, only the heads and face could be recognized, nothing else.”
Both Mr. Safi and Mr. Zahid said that British, French and Americans had come to the village and apologized for the deaths. NATO officials did not comment on whether its officers had apologized. The area is under the control of French troops.
Mr. Zahid said that he was comforted when he received a phone call from President Hamid Karzai after his son’s death. “I could not even imagine that the president would call and talk to a poor person from a rural village,” he said. “But when I heard his voice it gave me more hopes that our government is strong and they will avoid such incidents in the future and will bring the murderers to justice.”
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Leaving Afghan Development in the Wrong Hands
Why Relying on Locals Isn't the Answer
Foreign Affairs
By Matiullah Amin
February 13, 2012
As the date for the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan approaches, neither Washington nor Kabul is paying enough attention to long-term development. The lack of a strategy for the day after troops depart will leave Afghanistan unable to sustain itself -- a scenario that is not good for the Afghan people or for the donor population.
The international community, to the extent that it has considered the development question, has hung virtually all its hopes on the Afghan government's National Solidarity Program, which relies on rural citizens to carry out development projects. According to many think tanks, the NSP offers the best way forward, because, in the words of the Center for a New American Security, it "generates institutions at the local level that are crucial to any vision of a self-sustaining Afghan state."
But some major and unavoidable contradictions are built into the NSP framework, keeping the program from realizing its potential. Namely, by relying on unskilled local populations, the program dooms itself to inefficiency. Meanwhile, the NSP's too-short project timelines mean that there is hardly time to transfer any skills to locals, so gains are fleeting, if ever achieved at all. Unless its weaknesses are addressed, the NSP will prove unsustainable and could end up further undermining the Afghan people's confidence in their government -- the exact opposite of what the program was once hoped to deliver.
The NSP was created in 2003 by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development after Ashraf Ghani, the country's finance minister at the time, advocated for a community-led development program. He had closely followed the work of Scott Guggenheim, his friend from graduate school, who had successfully used the community-driven approach in Indonesia in the late 1990s. The NSP today consists of 28,884 Community Development Councils, which are elected to consult with locals to establish a list of development priorities. The projects they select together are meant to benefit a broad public, not just specific groups. While executing projects, the NSP emphasizes partnership between the government and local populations by integrating local preferences and ideas.
The NSP structure was intended to embody the notion of "participatory development," which has become something of a slogan within the development community. Today, the program is almost a poster child for the concept. Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), for example, touts it as giving communities the opportunity to create a new civic infrastructure -- an essential component of any successful counterinsurgency campaign. Some also believe that it strengthens the sense of local ownership in projects and ensures that the gains are sustained over the long term. After a visit to an NSP-built primary school near Bagram, for example, Levin noted that villagers were "prepared to defend [the school] with their lives against the Taliban."
Despite its good intentions, the NSP has fallen well short of expectations. Put simply, it is not very efficient: its wholehearted focus on giving communities everything they want diminishes its ability to deliver what they need. The NSP glorifies the processes at the expense of providing substantive outcomes.
To begin with, rural Afghans have low tolerance for social risk. Local consensus generally favors non-controversial programs, which, in turn, leads to a complete denial of important projects. One striking example is girls' education: a mere 4.34 percent of the total budget disbursed through the NSP since 2003 was directed toward education, and those funds are usually spent on the construction and refurbishment of schools. Only 30 percent of the schools built by the NSP are for girls.
Meanwhile, the NSP is plagued by a lack of expertise among its local staff. The Afghan civil war of the 1990s, and the years of Taliban rule that followed, brought the level of infrastructure and human capital in the country to near zero. Afghan villagers simply lack the skills needed to efficiently implement projects. For example, in 2010, villagers in Tatar Khil spent approximately $55,000 on a school that the NSP later declared "failed" due to inadequate quality. Yet another example is a school that the NSP built in Kapisa province that did not meet the quality standards set by the provincial Department of Education. In Baghlan province, locals received funds from the NSP to build hydroelectric power plants, water supply and irrigation networks, and sanitation facilities. But the necessary skills and equipment to complete such ambitious projects were in short supply and many of them were halted before they were finished -- or didn't work once they were.
Beyond NSP's regular two- to three-year commitment, some communities become eligible for what is called the Cycle III phase, formerly known as Cycle II+, which provides an additional 12 months of need-based support. The extra funds are meant to help communities successfully finish projects that they have already started. But not every villiage and town is assured of this extra help. Without it, the NSP's projects are simply too quick and too short-lived. What Afghanistan needs most is a population with technical skills. Those take longer to develop than two or three years.
Finally, since participatory development projects are planned and carried out at the local level, they are vulnerable to local "elite capture," or embezzlement by program officials. That is especially true for the NSP, given Afghanistan's tribal dynamics and the prominence local commanders gained during the anti-Soviet jihad. In Parwan province, one NSP council member, who was not elected but imposed on the program because of his powerful father was accused of siphoning off program money. He was never held responsible because he claimed to be protected by the police and a member of parliament. Donor representatives believe that local council members regularly hire relatives or friends from other villages for infrastructure projects; this raises their suspicions that they are not reliable partners and hold programs back from being efficient (on the other hand, some members might just trust family members to be more reliable).
The NSP will not put Afghanistan on the path to prosperity. What the country needs is a new program -- one that would overcome the current one's problems. For starters, such a program should reduce the maximum allotment of aid from $60,000 per community in phase one to $30,000. This would minimize the incentive for elites to steal and would allow rural communities to test out specific projects with smaller sums. A new NSP would also arrange for councils to work with communities for five to ten years, in order to transfer professional skills and give social norms a chance to change. (The two modifications would offset each other: increased commitment time would be made possible by a fifty percent cut in the first round of funding. The NSP currently promises $60,000 over two to three years; the new program would total that over five to ten.) A new and improved NSP would also require more community financial contribution to each project. The program would start off asking for a 10 percent payment, as the NSP currently does, but it would increase that ask by 10 to 15 percent every year to reduce dependency. By the time a project was completed, ownership and management would have completely transferred to locals.
The executive director of NSP, Mohammad Ismati, has set the goal of the organization "attaining the landmark of full national coverage" in the next four years. Instead, Afghans must strive for substantive outcomes in each and every community. Quality matters. If designed and implemented correctly, a smarter development strategy could provide for a sustainable transition beyond 2014; otherwise, Afghanistan is doomed to depending on others. And that would lead to a vicious cycle of instability and reduced donor commitment; Afghans, and the rest of the world, would have to start again from scratch.
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Security vs. Reconciliation: The Afghan Conundrum
New York Review of Books BLOG
By Ahmed Rashid
February 14 2012
The following is taking from the authors written briefing for the Munich Security Conference, an annual gathering of foreign ministers, heads of state, and other security experts, that took place February 3-5, 2012
After eleven years of war, the Talibans public declaration that they will hold talks with the United States in Qatar is a major breakthrough for the political process, for Afghanistans internal stability, and for progress toward relative peace that will be needed by the US and NATO in 2014 before they can exit Afghanistan in good order and without too much further bloodshed.
The year-long clandestine talks brokered by the Germans, fostered by Qatar, and now culminating in direct meetings between US officials and Taliban representatives will hopefully lead to a major reconciliation with the Kabul regime. The Talibans present insistence that they will only talk with the Americans and not with Afghan President Hamid Karzai is not realistic in the long term, while Karzais recent policy flip-flops and contradictory statements belie the fact that he has been kept in the loop every step of the way by the Germans. The talks will go ahead because the Taliban have expressed their readiness and there is no other alternative to ending the war.
There is considerable controversy and doubt about how successful NATO forces have been on the ground combating the Taliban, despite heady announcements by NATO generals. Unlike al-Qaeda, the Taliban have shown the ability to rebound from severe hits and proven remarkably unfazed by casualties, with a deep bench of commanders, logisticians, recruiters, and administrators for their cause.
In a summer offensive the Taliban can still mobilize some 25,000 fightersthe same figure they had in the 2005-6 campaigns. Taliban survival is directly linked to the sanctuary, support, and logistics they receive in neighboring Pakistan from various elements in that country. The US and NATO are preparing a comprehensive transition strategy for 2014 that entails handing over control of the country to government representatives at the district level and the newly-trained Afghan security forces, who now number some 352,000.
However, an exit strategy is not a political strategy and that is precisely what is lacking to ensure the future stability of Afghanistan and the volatile region that surrounds it.
Presidents Barack Obama and Hamid Karzai are both entangled in a series of strategic conundrums, which so far have not been adequately addressed. Karzai is determined to secure an agreement with the US allowing for the presence of US trainers and special forces in the country well beyond 2014. Washington would like to do the same. But the Taliban are vehemently opposed to any such US-Kabul agreement as it will appear to be aimed at them. Karzai will find it impossible to conclude both a security agreement with the US and a reconciliation agreement with the Taliban. The two aims are mutually exclusive.
The contradictory policy statements Karzai has made in recent months about reconciliation and the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar point to the fact that this reality is now dawning on the Afghan government: Karzai cannot be a partner to both the US and the Taliban and expect the Taliban to buy it. The Taliban have made it clear they expect all US troops to leave by 2014, while US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has sown confusion in NATO ranks by saying the US will end all combat operationsand presumably speed up troop withdrawalby 2013.
It is hard enough for Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar to sell the idea of reconciliation to his fighters. He will find it impossible to sell the idea of co-habitation with American bases beyond 2014. Many Afghans, including Karzai, want a prolonged presence of foreign troops to guarantee their own safety and security. However, the Taliban will only agree to a deal with Kabul when all foreign troops have left. There is not enough consideration in Washington or Brussels of this strategic conundrum.
The US, NATO, and Karzai need a political strategy to ensure that talks can lead to confidence building measures with the Taliban to reduce the violence; only then can negotiations on power-sharing between the Taliban and Karzai take place. However, Both the Obama and Karzai adminstrations are deeply divided on what should result from talking to the Taliban. The US military would like to degrade the Taliban further, while the State Department wants talks to be the main focus of US political strategy in the endgame in Afghanistan. Similarly Karzais advisers harbor differing opinions and numerous conspiracy theories about the talks and what they mean for their political future.
Secondly, a political strategy must entail a dialogue and eventual political agreement among Afghanistans neighbors in which they agree to limit their interference in Afghanistan. Apart from India, all other states in the regionChina, Russia, the five Central Asian republics, Pakistan and Iranare against any long-term presence of US troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014. No regional non-interference guarantees will be given by these states if the US retains bases.
In the past six months, intra-regional relations have gotten even worse. We have seen the collapse of US-Pakistan relations and the refusal of Pakistani leaders to even meet with US officials. In addition, the crisis between Iran and the rest of the world over Tehrans nuclear weapons program has further jeopardized any hope of Iran playing ball on Afghanistan. Tehran sees Afghanistan as a potential battleground if Israel or the US were to bomb or invade Iran.
There must be greater internal political cohesion inside Afghanistan. Karzai has failed to create a national consensus on supporting talks with the Taliban, nor has he offered a vision for the country beyond 2014. With many Pashtuns supporting reconciliation with the Taliban and most non-Pashtuns rejecting it, the ethnic divide in the country has widened enormously and will only grow more belligerent as the Taliban talks progress. Ethnic divisions could explode after the NATO withdrawal. Some experts even predict civil war.
In addition, there has been little preparation done by the West or Kabul to prepare for what is going to be a huge economic downturn in the country as aid levels drop precipitously, panic prevails in the marketplace, and investment is reduced.
It is also uncertain what Pakistanthe main regional stakeholder, with the Taliban leadership on its soilwill do given its poor relations with both Kabul and Washington. Pakistan has said it will facilitate the Qatar talks, but nobody, and least of all the Afghans, trusts Pakistani intentions. Ideally, Pakistan should:
take part in any talks;
allow the Taliban to travel and discuss the issues freely;
free the Taliban prisoners it is holding;
give the Taliban a deadline for reaching a settlement with Karzai, leaving Pakistan, and returning to Afghanistan.
These steps would speed up a peace settlement between Kabul and the Taliban.
Finally, far too many and dangerous political events are scheduled for Afghanistan in 2014. These include a US and NATO troop withdrawal; the test of whether the Afghan army can hold its ground; a presidential election, as Karzai will have to step down and new presidential candidates found. All this against the backdrop of a loss of public confidence inside this fledgling state and a lack of agreement among its neighbors.
To cope with all these uncertainties, all the players will have to be far more constructive, proactive, and flexible than they have been so far. The outlines of a more coherent strategy must be publicly articulated by the May NATO summit in Chicago so that the conspiracy theorists can be thwarted. Afghanistan and the Western alliance still have a long way to go before all the pieces for Afghan stability and a successful political exit strategy fall into place.
February 13, 2012, 11:45 a.m.
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Afghanistan combat outpost 'Aryan' draws protest
Msnbc.com
By Jeff Black
13/02/2012
Days after the Marines apologized for a flag resembling the Nazi “SS” symbol, new questions are being raised about an Army base in Afghanistan reportedly called “Combat Outpost Aryan.”
The Military Religious Freedom Foundation, which first raised the controversy over the “SS” photograph, is now demanding that the outpost be renamed and the circumstances surrounding the naming of the base be investigated.
MRFF founder Mike Weinstein told msnbc.com that he was contacted by numerous U.S. and Afghan soldiers who were upset about the name of the base and wanted it changed. He said he felt compelled to go forward with a complaint.
The word “Aryan” is associated with Nazis and white supremacists. A once-prominent white supremacist group called itself “Aryan Nations,” and the Nazis used the term to refer to a planned master race.
An attorney for the New Mexico-based foundation on Monday sent a letter to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta calling the implications of the name “clearly outrageous.”
“Today’s stunning information concerning the base near Kandahar being named ‘Aryan’ is simply too much to be coincidental,” the attorney, Randal Mathis, said in the letter. “Viewing either as trivially inadvertent would be preposterous. The horrendous religious and ethnic connotations are beyond dispute.…”
The Department of Defense, however, has said it's all a misunderstanding. A military spokesman told the Army Times that the base name was due to a misunderstanding and a misspelling. The spokesman said the name was actually "Combat Outpost Arian," named for a historical Persian tribe from western Afghanistan. Commander William Speaks told the Huffington Post that the word "Arian" is frequently used by Afghans, and pointed to the name Ariana Airlines.
Weinstein called the military's explanation completely bogus. "At first they said it didn't exist, and now they are saying it does exist but that it is a different name."
The foundation's research director, Chris Rodda, told msnbc.com that several independent sources, including photographs, Facebook posts and other references, have confirmed the base was spelled "Aryan." She said to claim that the base was named by Afghans is "preposterous." All other combat bases, she pointed out, carry clearly American names such as "Terminator" and "Michigan."
In addition, the Army Times reports that the name “COP Aryan” appears in a June 2011 news release on the website of the 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team.
"This is all part of the military's culture of intolerance," Rodda told msnbc.com. "We see it in regard to gender and race as well as religion." She claimed Nazi symbolism was common in the military.
Emails sent to the Department of Defense and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan were not immediately returned.
More content from msnbc.com and NBC News
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Dozens of Insurgents Surrender to Afghan Authorities
TOLOnews.com
Tuesday, 14 February 2012
Nineteen insurgents including their commanders laid down their weapons and surrendered to authorities in eastern Kunar province on Monday, local officials said.
"A total of 19 Taliban militants led by Taj Mohammad and Masood surrendered to the government in Kunar province," provincial head of peace council, Mawlawi Mohammad Hashim Munib said.
The men were active in Kunar and organised anti-government activities there, he said.
The commanders and his men submitted their weapons to Kunar police, officials said.
Mr Munib is confident that security will improve as more insurgents renounce violence in the province.
It comes as a total of 19 Taliban led by a Taliban shadow governor on Monday surrendered to the government in Chisht-e-Sharif district of Herat province, around 640 km from Kabul, provincial governor Daud Saba said.
The men were active in the province and fought against the government, he said.
The shadow governor and their men submitted their weapons to security troops, he added.
In the past six months, five insurgent groups have joined the Afghan peace process in the province, officials said.
Dozens of insurgents have recently joined the peace process in the province after Afghan and Nato forces increased military operations in the country to clear insurgents.
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Can the Afghan army take the lead in battle?
BBC News
By Quentin Sommerville
13 February 2012
Northern Helmand, Afghanistan
On a chilly winter morning just before daybreak, in northern Helmand, hundreds of Afghan soldiers are on the move.
The Afghan National Army is in the lead. Around 900 Afghan soldiers and police have flooded into this dusty corner of Helmand, just south of Highway One. They are searching for Taliban fighters; the Afghans outnumber their British advisors, nine to one.
The man in charge is Brig Gen Sheren Shah. He stands on the battlefield, brimming with self-confidence.
"Our foreign friends are in the back giving us support, but we know this place better, we know the language and only we can search the people and houses, not the foreigners," he said.
Earlier, in a briefing room, Afghan officers plotted the operation on a mud and rock map on the floor. Ramshackle affair
British officers might be looking over their shoulders, but for the first time this is an operation that is Afghan-conceived and executed. With most British troops leaving at the end of 2014, this is the shape of things to come.
"We used to lead and they would follow. Now it's the other way around. Even if they make mistakes, it's better they do it while we are here, not after we left," one British officer explained.
On the ground, the general and his Warriors, the official name for Afghan soldiers, get off to a flying start. They are helped by the fact that many of the Taliban in the area are lying low for the winter.
In the past the Afghan army was a ramshackle affair, but these soldiers are better equipped and more organised than before. They are wearing full body armour and form orderly lines as they spread out across the area.
But in the background, sitting in armoured vehicles, are British soldiers.
They are here as advisors, but they are doing much more than just advising. They are making sure the operation does not fall apart, and are determined to pass control to Afghans as soon as possible. It is an acceleration of the handover, perhaps a hasty one.
The Afghans find 14 improvised explosives devices (IEDs) planted by the Taliban. But it is British vehicles, clearing the route for an Afghan push, that sustain damage when a number of the homemade bombs detonate.
Lt Col Bill Wright, of the Brigade Advisory Group, is pleased with progress, but still sees big gaps in Afghan readiness.
"At the lowest tactical level they are very good, it's the bigger pieces now, ensuring that they've got the capability to service all their vehicles, and get the spares systems up and running, the logistics up and running, to keep what is a huge army on the road and in the fight," he said.
As the operation draws to a close, it is clear that British and American troops are still the powers behind the fight in Helmand.
Most foreign troops do not leave for another couple of years, but the limitations of the Afghan army to stand alone, and face a determined insurgency, are still plain to see.
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White House Proposes Cap on Wartime Spending
Wall Street Journal
By NATHAN HODGE And JULIAN E. BARNES
FEBRUARY 13, 2012
WASHINGTON
The Obama administration is proposing a cap on war outlays through fiscal 2021, the first time spending for military combat in Afghanistan and Iraq would be limited since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
The plan is part of a Pentagon budget that also reins in military health and retirement benefits, adjusts pay scales and trims equipment programs, a series of moves designed to impose financial discipline.
For the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1, President Barack Obama is seeking $525.4 billion for the basic operations of the Defense Department, plus $88.4 billion to support troops in Afghanistan.
The proposal is $6 billion lower than the 2012 base budget of $531 billion, approved by Congress, which was a cut of $22 billion from the administration's proposal for the current year. In 2012, Congress appropriated $115.1 billion for the Afghanistan war.
A main feature of the fiscal 2013 request is the proposal to limit "overseas contingency operations" appropriations—the amount spent that is beyond the regular Pentagon budget—to a total of $450 billion from fiscal 2013 through 2021.
The proposal to limit emergency war spending quickly drew fire from Republicans.
"The president's budget is a clear articulation of Mr. Obama's priorities: reduce resources for our struggling armed forces, and redirect them to exploding domestic bureaucracies," said Rep. Howard McKeon (R., Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. "This budget reflects a true reduction, in real terms, of military spending while we have troops in combat."
The administration is casting its proposal as a "multiyear" cap that would allow for flexibility from year to year and that could be adjusted in the event of an emergency.
Lawmakers exempted war costs from spending limits imposed under last year's budget control deal between the White House and Congress, creating what some called a "loophole" for the Pentagon to avert reductions.
Todd Harrison, a defense-spending expert at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a think tank with close ties to the Pentagon, said the president's proposal would close the loophole and "make it harder to circumvent the budget caps."
The new budget also cuts money for the Afghan security forces from $11.2 billion to $5.7 billion. Defense officials said that cut reflect the fact that the U.S. has met the equipment needs of the Afghan security forces, and can spend less on new weapons or vehicles.
The $88.4 billion war funding request for 2013 assumes that the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan will remain at 68,000, the current target level for September 2012.
"That doesn't mean there won't be later changes in Afghan troop levels, it does mean we don't bind the hands of the president," said Robert Hale, the Pentagon comptroller. "We want to let him hear the recommendations of his field commanders."
Obama administration officials have said that they want troop levels to continue to decline in 2013, but commanders in Afghanistan want to hold troops at 68,000 until the following year.
Last month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta outlined the defense-spending plan, which calls for a reduced global U.S. military footprint while shifting more investment to U.S. special-operations forces and high-tech weaponry.
Defense officials are pursuing a goal of a 30% increase in unmanned aircraft flights, but are slowing an aggressive drone acquisition plan so they can invest in training for new operators needed to fly them.
Instead of purchasing 48 new Reaper drones in 2013, Defense officials will purchase 24, and plan to buy the rest later.
During the height of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, increases in active-duty pay and benefits approved by Congress drove up personnel costs.
Health-care costs alone have more than doubled since 2001, rising to $49 billion from $19 billion. Both health and retirement benefits, military officials said, have to be brought into closer alignment with the private sector.
The Pentagon proposed a 1.7% pay increase for 2013, in line with private-sector increases. But the department said that, "in an effort to control costs," it is proposing lower raises for 2014 and beyond.
Also planned are increases in health enrollment fees and pharmaceutical co-pays.
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Afghan Taliban demands Pakistan explains former minister's death
Reuters
Mon Feb 13, 2012
KABUL
The Afghan Taliban demanded on Monday that Pakistan release details of how one of its former ministers died in a Pakistani jail in 2010.
Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, who was defence minister when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s, was captured in the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan in 2007, and died of heart disease in March 2010, the Taliban said in a statement.
Akhund's family have only recently been informed of his death.
"It is still not clear whether the hero of Afghanistan's jihad and (the) Islamic nation passed away of sickness or he had been martyred due to torture and torment," said Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesman for the Afghan Taliban.
"We strongly urge the Pakistani authorities to provide accurate and complete information regarding his detention, sickness and his death," Mujahid said.
Several militant groups, including the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda, operate in Pakistan's western regions, taking advantage of a porous border with Afghanistan to conduct cross-border attacks, or plot violence elsewhere.
Several senior members of the Taliban have been captured in Pakistan, while members of a Taliban leadership council known as the Quetta Shura, are believed to be based in the Pakistani city of Quetta, capital of Baluchistan province.
Pakistan has consistently denied giving sanctuary to insurgents and denies the existence of any Quetta Shura.
(Reporting by Hamid Shalizi; Editing by Daniel Magnowski and Robert Birsel)
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Afghanistan: What Explains Taliban Staying Power?
The Huffington Post
By Nake M. Kamrany Professor of Economics, University of Southern California
13/02/2012
The U.S. war in Afghanistan is one of three U.S. wars against low-income countries (Vietnam war and Iraq war) which posed no security threat to the U.S. All parties sustained enormous damages in blood and wealth. In retrospect, the projection of U.S power and influence was superfluous and had no purpose.
Nevertheless, it will be instructive to understand the staying power of the "rag-tag" Afghan Taliban against the awesome military might of the most powerful superpower the world has ever known -- the U.S. military. Ostensibly, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is finally winding down after the longest American war in U.S. history. The decision to wind down American engagement in Afghanistan was announced by U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, in a surprise announcement early this month that the U.S. plans to wind down its combat role in Afghanistan a year earlier and turn it over to Afghan forces.
Moreover, the U.S. has encouraged the Taliban to peace talks in Qatar both to end the war and ostensibly formulate a coalition government that would end tribal and ethnic violence in the country. The U.S. move is indeed a wise one to stop the bleeding wound (over 2000 U.S. soldiers dead and some 20,000 injured) and loss of direct wealth of approximately $264 billion ($2 billion per month for 132 months). It is an opportunity for the U.S. to declare victory over the Taliban, take its losses, quit and end this unwinnable war.
The Taliban sustained enormous losses over the last 10+ years of resistance including 396,000 dead, 792,000 inured and 65,000 civilian casualties plus destruction of some 12,000 villages. In light of this destruction, why did the Taliban not bend? Following are a number of socio-cultural and ethnic traits that shed some light on the issue.
1. The Taliban are of Pashtun tribe residing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pashtun tribe is the largest single tribe in the world (approximately 27 million). They conquered India seven times and were invaded by Alexander the Great, the Mongols. Great Britain (four times), the Soviet Union, and the United States. It is the graveyard of empires. It is axiomatic that the way a nation/people perceives its history is a strong influence of whether its society can resist foreign domination. Taliban belief that history is on their side is an invaluable moral asset in resisting a desperate war against an "invader" possessing massive advantage in mobility, fire power, wealth and political cohesion.
2. The U.S. reached the same conclusion as Great Britain did during the 1980s -- that the volatility of Afghan politics and the costs of maintaining large armies in a remote and difficult countryside (twice the size of Texas) is prohibitive. The Soviet soldiers (1979-89) occupied every one of the 36,000 villages and the minute they withdrew they lost the village. Afghans in general despises foreign occupation causing regular army soldiers not to shoot at Taliban and to make secret accommodations. As a result the Taliban shadow government in many provinces of Afghanistan is ruling.
3. Whenever there is a vast difference in the fire power of invaders and local resistance, the Afghans have adhered to guerrilla warfare of hit and run as they did against the Soviet forces and as they are doing now against the U.S. forces. The stoic acceptance of death against superior firepower explains the courage and physical toughness of the Taliban. These qualities were attested to by their British opponent during the Anglo-Afghan wars.
4. Family is the most important unit of social organization and it is impermeable and self-contained unit, extending to clan and tribe. The system is egalitarian and democratic and individualistic. Despite varied ethnic and linguistic groups, their value system is congruent in matters affecting their freedom, dignity, and religion. Any system that attacks the integrity and honor of the Afghan family-clan- tribe is bound to face severe retaliation. Those members of the family/clan/tribe who get killed in resistance are viewed as martyrs and the living members are expected to pursue resistance to the end.
5. The Taliban are not fanatical about ideologies or political causes. They are traditional Moslems and have a strong belief in the concept of fairness. They reject invasion by foreign forces as unfair and will resist at any cost. The most prized values in Afghan culture are bravery in combat. However, they do have a propensity to settle difference with enemies if it is fair. At times, however, they are stubborn, inflexible and superb bargainers; they will adhere to a position, even if unreasonable. To the bitter end.
It follows that the prospective peace negotiation with the Taliban in Qatar could suffer from communication and structural dissonance if the cultural imperatives are not appropriately considered. For a successful outcome, the negotiators shall be treated with dignity and respect keeping in mind that the political culture of Afghans rejects external authority and emphasizes freedom and independence. The culture is impermeable to the imposition of alien rule. It is doubtful to get Taliban acquiescence to a coalition government with Karzai, if they have any role in government, the current malaise of corruption, drug production, warlords, and drug lords will be eliminated.
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New wave of troops deploy to Afghanistan as part of NATO training mission
The Canadian Press
By Kevin Bissett
Monday, Feb. 13, 2012
CFB GAGETOWN, N.B
Family members wept and hugged each other as almost 100 soldiers departed Canadian Forces Base Gagetown on Monday night for Afghanistan to train troops from that nation.
The soldiers are the start of a wave of troops that will relieve the first rotation of military personnel who have been working with the country's security forces since last summer.
About 50 soldiers from the New Brunswick base joined another 50 from elsewhere in Atlantic Canada as they embarked on a mission aimed at strengthening the ability of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to quell the insurgency.
“This role is historic not only for Canada but for Afghanistan itself,” said Lieutenant.-Colonel Alex Ruff, commander of the Second Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment.
“It is providing the capabilities to allow Afghanistan to develop as a country and be able to do everything they need to do on their own,” he said.
Around 950 military personnel have been stationed in and around Kabul since July, providing classroom instruction to Afghan soldiers and police while also mentoring medical staff.
Small contingents of Canadian trainers have also been deployed to the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Herat in the west, near the border with Iran.
Troops have arrived in the area in rotations and serve an average of eight months in theatre.
One soldier died last fall as part of the training mission, which the federal government initially described as “low risk.”
Master Corporal Byron Greff of the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was killed when the vehicle he was riding in was struck by a powerful suicide car bomb on Oct. 29.
Lee Windsor, deputy director of the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick, said Canada's sacrifices in Afghanistan have earned troops respect with their Afghan counterparts.
“That record of combat experience and that knowledge of the unique circumstances of the Afghan environment gives Canadian advisers in the Afghan training schools the credibility they need in order to be respected,” Windsor said.
Though Canada has shifted its focus to training, fighting in Afghanistan has continued amid talk of negotiations with the Taliban and preparations for the handover of greater security responsibilities to the Afghan government.
The United Nations released a report earlier this month that concluded that last year was the deadliest on record for Afghan civilians, with 3,021 killed — an increase of eight per cent from the year before.
Private Justin Dolan, 22, from Miramichi, N.B., is making his first trip to Afghanistan.
“It's a very rewarding opportunity. I can't wait to get over there,” he said Monday night.
Still, he said it was going to be difficult spending eight months away from his family.
“We'll be able to communicate by phone and over the Internet,” he said as he held his 16-month old son Ethan.
For Sergeant Laurie Turner and Warrant Officer Harvey Flowers of Gaspe, Que., the deployment makes a big demand on the couple's family.
She left Monday night, while he deploys three weeks from now, and they'll be posted in different places in Afghanistan.
“There's a lot of emotions leaving the children behind, but I'm looking forward to going to see what it is like over there,” Turner said.
She said the role is much different from a combat mission, and soldiers are urged to create a bond with the Afghan people.
“We're there to help them,” she said.
Colonel Paul Rutherford, commander of CFB Gagetown, told the soldiers that staff at the base are ready to provide full support to their families during their deployments, and he reassured families that the soldiers have been well prepared and well trained.
“You're the very best Canada has to offer,” he said.
Canada's training mission is scheduled to conclude in 2014.
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6 Insurgents Killed in Clashes with Afghan Police
TOLOnews.com
Tuesday, 14 February 2012
At least six Taliban insurgents were killed in clashes with Afghan police in eastern Ghazni province on Monday, Ghazni police said.
The incident took place in Aab Band district of Ghazni province on Monday when Taliban insurgents attacked on Afghan police convoy, it said.
Ghazni police said that four Afghan policemen were wounded in the clash.
Aab Band is one of insecure districts in the province in which insurgents have been active and often targeted Afghan police checkpoints.
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Afghan civilians carry the burden
The Canberra Times
By REBECCA BARBER
14 Feb, 2012
On Sunday evening last week in the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan, an improvised explosive device hidden in a motorcycle detonated, killing one child and maiming four others. According to local media, the intended target was a member of the Uruzgan provincial council. Cold comfort for the grieving family whose loved ones were cut down in a bloody act of savagery.
Regrettably, it's not uncommon. Last week the UN released its annual report on the civilian cost of the Afghan war. The report shows that the number of civilians killed annually has risen steadily for the past five years, with the death toll in 2011 the highest so far recorded. More than 3000 civilians were killed last year, an increase of 8per cent from 2010, 25per cent from 2009 and 100per cent from 2007. More than 10,000 civilians have been killed in the past five years.
The increase in civilian casualties is attributed primarily to the changing nature of the insurgency. There's been a greater use of IEDs (improvised explosive devices ) across a wider geographical area, more frequent use of suicide attacks with a larger number of victims, and a greater number of targeted killings. More civilians have also been killed in aerial attacks carried out by international military forces.
The death toll tells only part of the story. Nearly 200,000 civilians were forced from their homes last year, an increase of 41per cent on the previous year, as the conflict moved from the traditional fighting areas in the south to the once-peaceful north and east.
Most concerning of all, the report describes the increasing victimisation of women and children. Some 166 women and 306 children were killed in the Afghan conflict in 2011, an increase of 29per cent and 51per cent respectively from 2010. These increases were due in part to the more frequent use of IEDs and aerial bombardments.
Australia's engagement in the war was debated in Parliament late last year. The Prime Minister, Opposition Leader and members of parliament discussed progress made, and the set-backs. They could almost have been describing a different war. From the Australian government, we heard that military operations throughout the year had weakened the Taliban's leadership and disrupted their ability to recruit and resupply, and that the ability of the Afghan army to combat IEDs had improved. The Prime Minister, Opposition Leader and members of parliament mourned the troops killed and wounded, and acknowledged their families and communities, and the ''police, diplomats, aid workers and other Australians working hard in Afghanistan''. With the exception of Senator Scott Ludlam, however, there was not a single reference to the Afghan civilians who year on year are paying a higher price for the war.
Australia has a strong, bipartisan commitment to an enduring relationship with Afghanistan, and expects to become a more important partner relative to other donors. This commitment would be welcomed by the Afghan men, women and children who so desperately long for peace. This year is an important one for Australia, as the government works towards defining the nature of its long-term partnership with Afghanistan. The nature of this and other government partnerships will be up for discussion at upcoming conferences in Chicago in May, and Tokyo in July.
If we're to leave Afghanistan a better place for its men, women and children, they must be at the heart of our partnership strategy. They must no longer be invisible, but rather must feature, in our parliamentary debates, in our reporting, and at every stage of planning, monitoring and evaluation by every government department and agency. As noted in the UN's report, to the Afghan people, the value of progress towards peace will be measured by reduced civilian casualties and improved security. This is the objective we should all be working towards.
Rebecca Barber is a humanitarian advocacy and policy adviser for Save the Children.
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Two Officers Counter Bleak Assessment of Afghan War
New York Times
By FERNANDO M. LUJáN and KHOSHAL SADAT
13/02/2012
Editor’s Note: A week ago, The New York Times (and At War) published pieces about an Army lieutenant colonel, Daniel L. Davis, who felt that the war in Afghanistan was not going well and that senior American military officials were not being honest about it. Lt. Col. Davis’ assertions, detailed in an unclassified report and an essay in Armed Forces Journal , have prompted much debate, pro and con. Below, two special forces officers, one an American who spent last year working with Afghan forces, and the other an Afghan, offer a different view. The officers did not write with the explicit purpose of countering Lt. Col. Davis, but merely to document their observations on the progress and pitfalls of training Afghan security forces in one very unsettled province. But the final product presents a far less pessimistic assessment of the Afghan forces than Lt. Col. Davis.
The first thing we noticed when we stepped off the helicopter in windswept Zabul province was a surprising but unmistakable feeling of pride and purpose among the Afghan soldiers. My friend Khoshal Sadat and I were visiting the first kandaks (battalions) to be declared officially independent in the entire country, and we secretly expected them to be in disarray. We were traveling as part of a tiny, specialized team of Afghan officers and Dari- or Pashto-speaking American advisers. Our job was to embed with units across the country and gain a deeper understanding of their challenges. We wore the same uniforms and rode in the same vehicles as the Afghan troops, spending long hours over dinners, patrols, and guard shifts talking about their hopes and fears now that American forces had pulled back.
A strange juxtaposition of enthusiasm and scarcity abounded everywhere; we felt elated and distraught at the same time. In their battalion headquarters, a special flag was displayed prominently on the wall. Called bayraq-e-iftekhar (the pride flag), this rectangular piece of red, black, green and blue fabric bearing two crossed swords was only issued to Afghan units that had demonstrated themselves capable of operating without United States assistance. They seemed to regard the flag with the deepest reverence, poking their heads in to stare at it, posting a guard at the door, showing us videos from the ceremony where they’d been awarded the honor. Yet in the same building, radios were rigged together with tape and wire, and a single crudely marked map hung in the corner.
We don’t share this story for idle entertainment purposes. In a few short weeks, the snow covering the mountain passes from Pakistan will start to melt, signaling the beginning of a fighting season that may prove the most critical of the war. While much attention has been focused on last year’s efforts to surge combat units and expand security across Southern Afghanistan, the most difficult work is about to begin: Coalition troops will try to hold onto hard-won security gains while simultaneously withdrawing forces and changing missions from “combat” to “advice and assistance.”
Khoshal and I would like to humbly offer our shared perspective — Afghan and American — in hopes that our experience in Zabul with these particular kandaks may help illuminate the challenges and unrealized potential of the fledgling Afghan security forces. Unlike the relatively safe areas in the north and west where other Afghan units have smoothly assumed responsibility for their sectors, Zabul — just north of Kandahar — is still bitterly contested by the enemy. (Indeed, this was the first place the Taliban chose to recruit and re-arm after their post-Sept. 11, 2001, defeat, and the province remains strategically important to this day.) Moreover, while the Afghan troops are impressive, the civilian government is still a long way from administering effectively and police forces lag badly behind their army counterparts.
Zabul is thus an invaluable test case and experiment. As momentum for the withdrawal of United States forces grows, it is likely that other Afghan battalions will find themselves in a similar plight — charged, somewhat prematurely, with holding onto “cleared” territory despite heavy pressure from a resilient Taliban, dwindling coalition resources and nascent civilian capacity. It seems that this war will largely be decided by the Afghans, long after the bulk of United States combat troops depart. Policymakers and leaders would be wise to take a good look at Zabul’s solitary kandaks — some of the first Afghan troops to take control of their own destinies — for they offer a wealth of important lessons and a bellwether of our future prospects.
Over the next few days of our team’s visit, we saw more odd juxtapositions. Out on tiny firebases — no matter how remote or austere — Afghan soldiers ran to stand in formation when we arrived, the lieutenant in charge shouting his report: “One officer, one sergeant, 10 soldiers ready for inspection! For Afghanistan we serve!” But looking down at the soldiers’ feet, we often saw toes sticking through boots worn down by countless patrols in mountainous terrain. In the absence of formal resupply, they improvised: Soldiers scrubbed 55-gallon fuel drums clean and converted them to makeshift water tanks, carrying them a kilometer up the mountain on their backs every morning. They dug holes in the ground to keep food cool.
On patrol one day, we watched an Afghan soldier using a long wooden rake to probe for buried mines and tripwires, calmly scraping the dirt a few feet in front of him. When he saw something suspicious, he’d get down on all fours and rub his hand along the ground. No bomb suit, no metal detector.
Every dawn after prayer, the soldiers would pile into unarmored pickup trucks, waving huge Afghan flags and rifles, then drive down the most dangerous roads in the country looking for the Taliban. Sometimes an engine would sputter and fail, and the soldiers would huddle together to push the truck to a running start. The sight was both inspiring and heartbreaking — some of the bravest and most committed men we’ve ever seen, in some of the worst conditions.
Khoshal and I spent long hours talking about what we’d seen, trying to understand how the Afghans could have such apparent motivation — especially at the lowest levels — but still sometimes struggle to get basic supplies or coordinate operations. We decided that the answer was much like the Afghan proverb: “The wheat is a little wet, but the millstone is a little dull.” Both sides share some blame.
Success in an advisory mission starts with the right mindset. One of the most commonly heard refrains from United States soldiers across the country is that Afghans “just don’t understand,” but how much of the methods and processes that these soldiers struggle to teach are uniquely Western, crudely grafted onto an Afghan military culture that bears little resemblance to their own? In one operations center we visited, a well-intentioned adviser had left behind several translated copies of the United States counterinsurgency manual and charts from Fort Leavenworth up on the wall, but the Afghans had little idea how to use them, leaving them up more out of deference than utility. In another office, the Afghan staff struggled to use PowerPoint on their computers, spending more time adding sound effects and drawings than actually understanding the operation.
Yet as home to the first Afghan units to demonstrate the ability to operate alone, Zabul also held examples of exceptionally effective advising: One innovative United States platoon learned to deal in white boards and terrain models instead of plasma screens and computers; to explain their points in well-known proverbs instead of slides and bullet points; to let the Afghans consistently take the lead, even if doing so meant the mission took twice as long and was half as successful. Undeterred by stories of Afghan soldiers shooting coalition advisers, these Americans lived in the same compound as their counterparts, spending countless hours working, eating, training and relaxing together. In their view, staying safe depended more on knowing the Afghans well and building strong relationships — not imposing stricter rules or staying in the bunker.
At another base, we saw something truly remarkable: Afghan sergeants — their advisers now gone — organizing every day for meetings to have real, candid discussions about how they could continue training their troops, learn from past mistakes, or improve discipline. The meetings were a far cry from what might be seen in the United States Army or Marines, but they were effective — and the Afghans conducting them a much more important indicator of progress than other metrics we tend to watch.
Which is to say that as coalition forces begin to withdraw, the mission must be about the Afghans they train and empower. Rotating home after year-long deployments, American soldiers should measure their success by looking at the impact they’ve made on their Afghan partners — not at the terrain they’ve seized or the enemies they’ve killed. This seems somewhat obvious in theory, but can be extraordinarily difficult for coalition units to realize once they arrive on the ground and feel the pressure from higher headquarters to demonstrate ‘results’ in a short period of time. “We cleared 2 villages, captured 5 Taliban and constructed a school” is much easier to report than “Sergeant Jamaluddin finally started to earn the trust of his men, learned how to spot an ambush, or built a relationship with the local malik” — especially when the quality of Afghan leaders is uneven at best, and even the smallest Afghan-led operation can be a monumental task. Yet this is the only way to succeed.
Learning to have the patience or cultural understanding to be an effective adviser does not come naturally to many coalition troops. In fact, finding the right person for this type of mission is even more important than providing him (or her) with the right mix of language training, role-playing exercises and technical expertise before the deployment. But all too often when the conventional military is forced to assign leaders to “combat” versus “advisory” missions, the best are sent to fight while marginal performers are relegated to train and advise. Units assigned this duty are frequently created ad hoc, with little experience working together and no familiarity with Afghan culture. Additionally, some of the most valuable advisory positions — those involving experience in logistics or human intelligence or fire support — often go understaffed or neglected. The Afghans may learn to walk perfect patrols, but without the ability to sustain themselves on a basic level — to get fuel and ammo, find the enemy, or call for support in a firefight — none of the recent security gains can endure.
Equally critical to the advisory effort is continuity: After individuals are selected and trained, they must be sent to work with the same Afghan units again and again — long-term personal relationships are the real coin of the realm in Afghanistan. Khoshal and I repeatedly saw this at work in Zabul and other provinces, where United States Special Forces soldiers who had been rotating into country since 2002 had forged friendships with Afghan leaders that allowed them to have real, closed-door conversations about the most difficult subjects — bribery, incompetence or politics — then work to address these impediments to institutional change. The numbers associated with these types of embedded advisers are comparatively small — whether special operations or conventional, civilian or military — yet these people must be the very best, and prepared to dedicate years to the mission.
We’ve talked much about the millstone, but little about the wheat. None of these changes can succeed without help from the Afghans, and their chain of command also faces a daunting personnel challenge: Finding a way to remove leaders who are predatory, incapable or corrupt. A single bad kandak commander can set back the counterinsurgency effort in his area by years, driving the locals to the Taliban and poisoning the unit culture. Too often, Afghan leaders are forced to avert their eyes when the offending individual is politically connected in Kabul or protected by a powerful friend. Instead, the best, the most qualified, must rise to the top. This may not happen in a year or even five — but it must happen if we are to succeed. Already there are signs of this in Zabul, where ethnic distinctions and political ties are starting to blur in the kandaks under shared hardship and experience. Our peers, the youngest generation of Afghan soldiers and officers, are eager for more of these changes, and they whisper about it every chance they get.
It is these young Afghan leaders who will ultimately succeed or fail. They must take the lead from their coalition advisers, and show the same pride and commitment we saw in Zabul. While the soldiers we visited there were certainly exceptional, they were not as rare as one might think. On other trips, in Kandahar, Helmand or Uruzgan, we saw other Afghans at far-flung bases who showed the same determination and resolve. Sometimes they formed a majority, but other times they worked alone or in small groups of like-minded believers, surrounded by many who lacked their ability, experience or desire. They must continue to find each other, to organize and grow the institution from within. They must take the training and equipment that the coalition provides and use it for the right purpose — not to find a civilian job in Kabul or enrich themselves with bribes — but to make the Army stronger and protect Afghanistan from its enemies. Now is the time for those leaders to step forward, as members of the most established institution in Afghanistan, and set an example for the rest of the country.
On the final night of our embed, we stayed on a remote firebase in the mountains. The Afghans had received word of an impending Taliban attack, by perhaps 50 or 60 fighters. Without any prompting, the officer in charge, a grizzled lieutenant who’d lost an eye in a firefight years ago, immediately started going through rehearsals for an attack. Calmly directing his men, he drilled them again and again about what position they’d take on the walls, what code words they’d use for different actions. Then he invited us to join him on a night ambush, hoping to hide some of his men high on the mountain and surprise the Taliban as they approached the camp. He briefed his soldiers on a large-terrain model, held inspections, then we moved out just before the moon started to rise in the sky.
Staring over our rifle sights in the darkness, I asked him in a whisper if his men could fight off the attack. Surprisingly candid, he explained that it all depended on his men’s confidence. That night, with a tiny group of United States Special Forces joining them, his men felt good. Other times, they’d had a team with a radio that could call for airstrikes and medical evacuation, or they knew American fighter jets were in the air. Even with no coalition troops around this time, he explained that if they could just trust that their superiors in Kabul or Kandahar would support them, they would know that they were stronger than the enemy. After a long pause, he turned to me and said something I still remember: “This will be a long war, my friend, and I don’t know if I’ll live to see the end of it. But the Afghan Army will fight, and we’ll win. We just need a little help.”
Maj. Fernando M. Luján is a Dari-speaking United States Army Special Forces officer and fellow at the Center for a New American Security who embedded with Afghan units last year as part of the NATO commander’s Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team. He wrote about Afghanistan for The Times last year. Major Khoshal Sadat is an Afghan Special Forces officer specializing in counterterrorism who is currently attending the United States Command and General Staff College and Army Ranger school. They will both return to Afghanistan after their current assignments.
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How Not to Withdraw From Afghanistan
The Huffington Post
By Joshua Gleis Analyst, Consultant, Author
13/02/2012
Last week, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated publicly for the first time that the United States would end combat operations in Afghanistan by mid-2013. While the defense secretary argued that U.S. forces would follow the model of the American withdrawal from Iraq, it seems more likely that it will repeat the mistakes made by the Soviets during their withdrawal from Afghanistan nearly 25 years ago. Let's be clear: deciding to withdraw from Afghanistan is not the problem. There are many legitimate arguments to be made for the U.S. to have pulled out of Afghanistan long ago -- such as after the assassination of Osama Bin Laden. The main problem is the way in which the withdrawal is being conducted by the United States. Its activities will do nothing to advance the American role in Afghanistan or around the world. On the contrary, it may ultimately result in further coalition casualties, and embolden the Taliban, Iran, Pakistan, and al Qaeda.
U.S. and NATO forces have a history of contradicting themselves when it comes to policies in Afghanistan. Soon after Panetta's comments, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh-Rasmussen explained that "this change of role takes into account the actual security situation on the ground." These comments eerily mimic earlier contradictions made by the U.S. government. In November of 2010, the Obama administration first announced that U.S. forces would be fully withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. President Obama added that the "transition will be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops." Yet it was not long before Vice President Biden changed tunes, explaining that 2014 was a "drop dead date" for "transitioning" power to Afghan authorities. Beginning this year, tens of thousands of ISAF combat forces will be pulled out of Afghanistan, and nobody really believes anybody will reverse this course should conditions further deteriorate... surely the Taliban do not.
In the case of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, the United States managed to successfully put an end to the violent insurgencies being waged by both the Sunnis and Shiites prior to announcing its date for withdrawal. This was done through a combination of successful counter-insurgency operations as well as through negotiations with insurgent groups. Once those negotiations were successful, and with the military now in control of a quelled insurgency campaign, the U.S. government was able to further negotiate an effective withdrawal with the Iraqi government. Whatever happens to Iraq in the future, it will be difficult for anybody to legitimately argue that the United States was forced out of Iraq by insurgents, and therefore U.S. deterrent power -- something not to be underestimated -- will remain intact. Due to recent moves by the Obama administration and its European partners, at this point in time the same will not be said for a future withdrawal from Afghanistan.
In examining a number of past withdrawals from insurgencies, many important lessons were found that the Obama administration has thus far failed to incorporate or comprehend. First and foremost is the need to establish realistic goals. After more than 10 years of combat in Afghanistan, it has become less clear -- not more -- as to why ISAF forces remain.
Most Americans and Europeans are unclear as to what our goals and objectives are for Afghanistan. If it was simply to destroy al Qaeda, this has largely been accomplished for quite some time. If it's to destroy the Taliban and create a relatively united country, we should be prepared to remain in Afghanistan for many more decades to come. If it's to establish a Western-style democracy, we can expect to be there for centuries. When the United States invaded Afghanistan after 9/11, the only stated goal was to go after al Qaeda and put an end to their safe haven. That safe haven has now largely moved to Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. Whatever the case may be, without knowing the goals we set out for, it's difficult for us to claim that we accomplished our mission in Afghanistan, or to justify that our men and women need to remain in that country for even one more day, let alone another two years.
A second lesson to be learned from studies of past counterinsurgency withdrawals, is that while states can and should negotiate with their adversaries they should only do so when they are in a position of strength, not of weakness. The United States began negotiations with the Taliban only after declaring that all ISAF forces will withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014. This removed most incentive for the Taliban to negotiate in good faith or moderate its stance. The newest declarations that the U.S. and NATO will end combat operations by mid-2013 can only worsen the outcome of negotiations. The Taliban now know for certain that whatever the outcome of negotiations, within a few years the West will not be there to prevent the Taliban from maximizing their goals or negate their claims that they alone defeated the United States and NATO.
A final critical lesson the Obama Administration has missed is that states should only declare red lines that they are willing and able to enforce. American and NATO claims that the withdrawal is "conditions-based" is not in keeping with this principle. Nobody believes that a significant number of ISAF forces will remain past 2014 at most. Right now we are trying to bluff our way through negotiations with the Taliban, even though we have showed our cards before the poker game even began. So much of conducting a successful counterinsurgency is the ability to win over the domestic population and establish their trust. That will be more and more difficult as local Afghanis know that ISAF forces are leaving shortly, and that there will be retribution once the Americans are gone.
To combat these efforts, the U.S. military has promised to push deeper into enemy strongholds and fight more aggressively against the Taliban in the lead up to the withdrawal. If the cases of Israel in Lebanon or France in Algeria are a good indication, the likelihood of the U.S. succeeding in that task is low. More likely the increased combat will see an emboldened enemy hungry to bloody the retreating Western power and tear apart the uneasy alliance with the Afghan military. Alternatively, the Taliban may follow the lead of the Mujahideen during the finals years of the Soviet occupation, and lay low until outside forces have departed.
As the Obama Administration has attempted to paint a picture of counterinsurgency successes, highlighting increased Taliban casualties and capture of fighters, NATO's own "State of the Taliban 2012" report indicates that Taliban morale is high and that they are winning over the hearts and minds of many Afghanis.
The United States has the best soldiers, sailors, and Marines fighting in Afghanistan, but they are fighting a war without clear goals or strategies, and backed by a failing economy. The Obama administration is perhaps right to pull out of Afghanistan, but it needs to figure out how to do so more responsibly and effectively.
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Civilian Casualties is a Tragedy: Isaf
TOLOnews.com
Monday, 13 February 2012
Death of innocent people not associated with armed conflict is a tragedy, Isaf Spokesman, General Carsten Jacobson, said on Monday.
A Nato air strike which took place last Wednesday in Giwa in eastern province of Kapisa killed at least 8 children and escalated the tensions between the Afghan government and Nato.
"At this point in our assessment we can neither confirm nor deny with reasonable assurance a direct link to the engagement, nonetheless any death of innocent not associated with armed conflict is a tragedy, we simply are not yet certain how this happened," General Jacobson said.
The Afghan government said the Kapisa attack, and a recent air strike in the eastern province of Kunar that killed seven civilians, had people in both provinces demanding curbs on Nato operations ahead of the planned departure of foreign combat troops by the end of 2014.
There are around 130,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan with 90,000 of US troops holding the leading position.
The Foreign combat troops will withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 as the transition process is under way.
Recently Nato and US officials have agreed to wind down troops by mid next year and hand over all responsibilities to Afghan security forces.
This comes as a delegation of Afghan government was sent to Kapisa to investigate the incident.
Meanwhile, Isaf has expressed concern over the two would-be suicide bombers who were captured by National Directorate of Security officials in Kandahar province after the two were released by Afghan President Hamid Karzai earlier.
Five Taliban members and two kids were captured in Kandahar province, a provincial spokesman Zalmai Ayoubi said.
These kids and eighteen others were released by President Karzai last August and were sent to Pakistan to join their families.
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Envoy Reiterates Iran's Continued Support for Afghanistan
FNA
13/02/2012
TEHRAN
A senior Iranian diplomat described the ties between Iran and Afghanistan as "brotherly", and voiced Tehran's continued support for the war-torn neighboring state.
Addressing a ceremony on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of the Victory of the Islamic Revolution, Tehran's Ambassador to Kabul Fada Hossein Maleki said that the relations between Iran and Afghanistan are based on mutual respect and not interfering in one another's affairs.
He underscored that after downfall of Taliban regime Iran's principle policy is to help establish stability, peace, fighting terrorism and narcotics in Afghanistan.
He stressed Iran aims to help establishing peace and stability inside the region.
Late in January, Iran and Afghanistan inked a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on mutual cooperation in economic fields.
The MoU was inked by Iranian Deputy Economy Minister Behrouz Alishiri and his Afghan counterpart Mustafa Mastoor at the end of the two countries' second joint economic commission meeting in Kabul.
The two sides agreed to increase cooperation in customs, banking and insurance sectors, as well as preventing smuggling of goods at borders.
Iran and Afghanistan enjoy expanding ties and cooperation and observers believe that the good achievements gained in area of their mutual cooperation should be deemed as a result of the efforts made by the two countries' leaders.
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Did the United States use the Kashmir earthquake to send intelligence operatives into Pakistan?
Foreign Policy (blog)
By Blake Hounshell
Monday, February 13, 2012
That's the charge the National Journal's Marc Ambinder makes in his very interesting new book on Joint Special Operations Command, coauthored with D.B. Grady.
They write:
The U.S. intelligence community took advantage of the chaos to spread resources of its own into the country. Using valid U.S. passports and posing as construction and aid workers, dozens of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives and contractors flooded in without the requisite background checks from the country's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Al-Qaeda had reconstituted itself in the country's tribal areas, largely because of the ISI's benign neglect. In Afghanistan, the ISI was actively undermining the U.S.-backed government of Hamid Karzai, training and recuiting for the Taliban, which it viewed as the more reliable partner. The political system was in chaos. The Pakistani army was focused on the threat from India and had redeployed away from the Afghanistan border region, the Durand line, making it porous once again. To some extent, the Bush administration had been focused on Iraq for the previous two years, content with the ISI's cooperation in capturing senior al-Qaeda leaders, while ignoring its support of other groups tha would later become recruiting grounds for al-Qaeda.
A JSOC intelligence team slipped in alongside the CIA. The team had several goals. One was prosaic: team members were to develop rings of informants to gather targeting information about al-Qaeda terrorists. Other goals were extremely sensitive: JSOC needed better intelligence about how Pakistan tranported its nuclear weapons and wanted to pentrate the ISI. Under a secret program code-named SCREEN HUNTER, JSOC, augmented by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and contract personnel, was authorized to shadow and identify members of the ISI suspected of being sympathetic to al-Qaeda. It is not clear whether JSOC units used lethal force against these ISI officers; one official said that the goal of the program was to track terrorists through the ISI by using disinformation and psychological warfare. (The program, by then known under a different name, was curtailed by the Obama administration when Pakistan's anxiety about a covert U.S. presence inside the country was most intense.)
Meanwhile, rotating teams of SEALs from DEVGRU Black squadron, aided by Rangers and other special operations forces, established a parallel terroris-hunting capability called VIGILANT HARVEST. They operated in the border areas of Pakistan deemed off limits to Americans, and they targeted courier networks, trainers, and facilitators. (Legally, these units would operate under the authority of the CIA any time they crossed the border.) Some of their missions were coordinated with Pakistan; others were not. As of 2006, teams of Green Berets were regularly crossing the border. Missions involved as few as three or four operators quietly trekking across the line, their movements monitored by U.S. satellites and drones locked onto the cell phones of these soldiers. (The cell phones were encrypted in such a way that made them undetectable to Pakistani intelligence.) Twice in 2008, Pakistani officials caught wind of these missions, and in one instance, Pakistani soldiers operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas fired guns into the air to prevent the approach of drones.
Forward intelligence cells in Pakistan are staffed by JSOC-contracted security personnel from obscure firms with insider names such as Triple Canopy and various offshoots of Blackwater, but it is not clear whether, as Jeremy Scahill of the Nation has argued, the scale of these operations was operationally significant or that the contractors acted as hired guns for the U.S. government. Sources say that only U.S. soldiers performed "kinetic" operations; Scahill's sources suggest otherwise. The security compartments were so small for these operations (one was known as QUIET STORM, a particularly specialized mission targeting the Pakistani Taliban in 2008) that the Command will probably be insulated from retrospective oversight about its activities. A senior Obama administration official said that by the middle of 2011, after tensions between the United States and the Pakistani government had reached an unhealthy degree of danger, all JSOC personnel except for its declared military trainers were ferreted out of the country. (They were easy to find using that same secret cell phone pinging technology.) Those who remained were called Omegas, a term denoting their temporary designation as members of the reserve force. They then joined any one of a dozen small contracting companies set up by the CIA, which turned these JSOC soldiers into civilians, for the purposes of deniability.
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Investigation Launched Over $42m Hospital Embezzlement
TOLOnews.com
By Wali Arian
Monday, 13 February 2012
High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption Strategy said on Monday that investigation about embezzlement of $42 million at Sardar Mohammad Dawood Khan Hospital has been launched.
A delegation comprised of Isaf and Afghan government officials has been assigned to investigate about the embezzlement, Director of High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption Strategy said.
"The delegation will try to find out what has been paid, to whom and when," Mr Ludin said.
Previously, Nato officials had said that 42 million US dollars had been embezzled by officials at Sardar Mohammad Dawood Khan Hospital.
After the claim, several hospital officials were sacked.
Mr Ludin also criticised establishment of a similar office to fight corruption and said that the Joint Commission of Oversight on Implementation of International Projects in Afghanistan were in vain.
Fight against corruption has been one of the major government plans in the past years.
Despite establishment of several institutions to fight corruption, it is believed that efforts have failed.
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Parliament to decide fate of Nato supply lines: Kayani
DAWN.COM
13/02/2012
JACOBABAD
Pakistan’s army chief said on Monday that the fate of Nato supplies to Afghanistan will be decided by the country’s political leadership.
Addressing reporters at the Shahbaz Airbase, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani said that the prime minster had given his clear stance over the issue and that the parliament’s defence committee will decide if the key supply line to combat forces in Afghanistan should be re-opened or not.
Referring to the army’s operation in tribal areas, Kayani said that limited force was being used in these areas.
The Pakistan army is criticised for securing a large part of the country’s annual budget. Kayani, however, clarified that the country’s defence budget was only 18 per cent and not 70 per cent.
“Out of this 18 per cent, army’s share is 8.5 per cent,” he added.
Kayani welcomed the induction of new fighter planes in Pakistan’s fleet, saying “the move will strengthen our defence.”
Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman on the occasion said that the Shahbaz Airbase was under their complete control.
Another senior Pakistan Air Force (PAF) official told journalists that air bases in Pasni and Jacobabad were under use of Americans during 2002-2004.
He said that Pakistan had the capability of bringing down drones being operated by the United Stated in the tribal areas, but the policy and decision rests with the parliament.
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19 Taliban surrender in western Afghan province
Xinhua
Feb. 13, 2012
HERAT, Afghanistan
A total of 19 Taliban fighters surrendered to government on Monday in Herat province, some 640 km west of capital city of Kabul, provincial governor said.
"Today, 19 armed Taliban rebels, including their commander namely Syed Zia, laid down their arms in Chishti Sharif district and surrendered to the government. We appreciate their decision and hope other oppositions to follow the step," Governor Daud Sabah told Xinhua.
He said the former commander of insurgents Syed Zia was serving as Taliban shadowy governor in Chishti Sharif district before joining the peace process.
Taliban militants fighting the government have yet to make comment.
More than 3,000 militants, according to officials, have laid down arms and resumed normal life in Afghanistan over the past one year, according to officials.
However, the Taliban outfit has termed the claim as baseless, saying no Taliban loyalists have surrendered.
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